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Diversity May Be Justified
Anita Bernstein*
What about diversity as a rationale for affirmative action is compelling enough to justify
the hurts it inflicts on individuals? Judges, legislators, public opinion, and implementers
of diversity programs in education and the workforce have defended their initiatives
either with vague, anodyne, ill-founded paeans or, more often, with silence about what the
rationale achieves. They have offered no justification of diversity.
From the premise that any state action that generates (or even risks) harm must be
supported with reason, this Article undertakes the task of justification. What makes
diversity unique among the rationales for affirmative action, this Article argues, is its
power simultaneously to achieve two social goods—the repair of subordination and the
strengthening of pluralism—that rest on independent and mutually constitutive
jurisprudential bases.
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Introduction
Institutions struggle to defend their policies of discrimination aimed
at liberal ends. When a complainant objects in court to such an initiative,
judges are likely to condemn it as a violation of constitutional or
statutory rights. Proffered rationales for progressive-minded
1
discrimination—known for decades as affirmative action —typically fail.
2
Maintaining that only “a compelling governmental interest” will
permit state action that takes codified characteristics of an individual into
1. The first use of this phrase in American federal law appears in an executive order signed by
President John F. Kennedy soon after he took office. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 6,
1961) (directing federal contractors to take affirmative action toward equal employment opportunities).
Used to describe overt efforts for redress, however, “affirmative action” appeared in print in 1866; it has
been applied to civil rights since World War II. See Kevin L. Yuill, Richard Nixon and the Rise of
Affirmative Action: The Pursuit of Racial Equality in an Era of Limits 33–34 (2006).
2. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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account, and giving private sector employers little room to maneuver
3
around antidiscrimination laws, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a
range of reasonable-sounding motivations for affirmative action—
4
including the repair of statistically manifested inequality, the need for
5
schoolchildren to have role model teachers, and plausible worries about
6
a disparate-impact discrimination claim in the future —do not justify this
measure. A state actor may still implement a group-based remedy for
7
past wrongs, but courts, led here by the Supreme Court, seldom agree
that any historical violation of law justifies sorting persons based on their
8
membership in a class.
Thus affirmative action, barely legal these days, stays alive in
9
American law with the help of one last rationale. The rationale left
standing is diversity, understood descriptively as “those differences in
values, attributes, or activities among individuals or groups that a
particular society deems salient to the social status or behavior of those
10
individuals or groups.” Understood normatively as a rationale for
action, it casts institutional practices that would otherwise violate the
civil or constitutional rights of individuals in a positive light. Diversity
makes discriminatory behaviors lawful.
Diversity can go only so far in aid of affirmative action. At least
three limitations reduce its reach. First, the Supreme Court has deemed
3. A generation ago the Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act permits employers to
impose plans that discriminate in favor of protected groups. Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara
Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (upholding a program that favored women); United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (upholding a program that favored racial minorities). On the
dwindling strength of these precedents, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity,
Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 3–4 (2005).
4. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
5. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
6. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009).
7. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of Equality: On the Importance of Disentangling
“Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 Wash. U.
L. Rev. 907, 917 (2010).
8. See Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distractions, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1625–26 (2003) (attributing
this narrow range of acceptability to the consensus-minded jurisprudence of Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor).
9. On its fragility, see Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 Yale L.
& Pol’y Rev. 1, 34 (2002) (calling diversity a “rhetorical Hail Mary pass, an argument made in
desperation when all other arguments for preferences have failed”); Adam Liptak, College Diversity
Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR4 (predicting rejection by the Supreme Court in
the 2012 Term); Adam Liptak, Justices Take up Race as a Factor in College Entry, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
2012, at A1 (reporting a certiorari decision that “has the potential to eliminate diversity as a rationale
sufficient to justify any use of race in admissions decisions”).
10. Peter H. Schuck, Diversity in America: Keeping Government at a Safe Distance 7 (2003).
For other definitions, see Katharine Esty et al., Workplace Diversity: A Manager’s Guide to
Solving Problems and Turning Diversity into a Competitive Advantage 1 (1995); Maureen J.
Giovannini, What Gets Measured Gets Done: Achieving Results Through Diversity and Inclusion, 27 J.
Quality & Participation 21, 22 (2004) (defining diversity as “any dimension that can be used to
differentiate groups and people from one another”).
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particular programs defended in the name of affirmative action
11
unconstitutional, foreclosing this rationale from supporting replications.
Second, on occasion a better justification for affirmative action than
diversity will be available to state-actor defendants accused of
12
discrimination in favor of subordinated groups. Third, even when it
13
prevails, the diversity rationale seems to trouble lawyers and judges. For
all its infirmities, however, diversity endures as the strongest rationale to
support progressive-minded discrimination when these measures are
14
challenged in court.
In hindsight, one could have predicted that this ideal would fare well
15
in American doctrine and discourse. Using diversity as policy adverts to
past invidious discrimination—a reality that participants in dialogues
about social welfare wish to acknowledge—but also tactfully refrains
from accusing anyone of doing wrong. The term invokes mending rather
than penalty or detriment, and expansion rather than a painful zero-sum
16
struggle over some scarce good. Diversity invites; it implies welcome.
Bounteous connotations evaporate on closer examination, however.
Listeners might hear promises in it, but any promises in the term are
17
projections. Diversity means what those who use it want it to mean.
The indeterminate legal content of diversity has generated an
enormous yet incomplete literature. Writers—including those who like

11. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 724–25
(2007) (rejecting the diversity rationale as used in grade-school education); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 269 (2003) (invalidating a diversity plan that assigned state-university applicants points
for particular characteristics).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166–67 (1987) (approving an affirmative
action plan by the Alabama Department of Public Safety to remedy past discrimination); see also infra
text accompanying notes 60–61.
13. See Smith v. Univ. Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (condoning a diversity
plan as “the narrowest footing upon which a race-conscious decision making process could stand”);
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941–42 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting a lack of consensus among the Justices
about diversity as a compelling governmental interest).
14. Krotoszynski, supra note 7.
15. On support in doctrine, see infra Part I.A.; on support in discourse, see Walter Benn
Michaels, The Trouble with Diversity: How We Learned to Love Identity and Ignore Inequality
12 (2006) (“[D]iversity has become virtually a sacred concept in American life today. No one’s really
against it; people tend instead to differ only in their degrees of enthusiasm for it and their ingenuity in
pursuing it.”); Trina Jones, The Diversity Rationale: A Problematic Solution, 1 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 171,
172–75 (2005) (reviewing poll data and commentary published in the popular press).
16. Compare Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really
Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1222, 1223–24 (1991) (criticizing the diversity rationale for
its inattention to historical wrongs), and Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique
of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 928, 953 (2001), with Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term’s Affirmative Action Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 98 (1986)
(arguing that “a focus on the sins of discrimination” dooms affirmative action measures to partial
success).
17. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1839, 1849 (1996) (“Everybody
talks about diversity, but no one knows what it means.”).
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affirmative action and those who don’t—have called it shallow, hollow,
18
inane. This charge provokes a battle-weary response from the left:
Because diversity is now the strongest rationale to support governmental
recognition of individuals’ membership in subordinated groups, activists
should work with what they have rather than waste time mourning the
19
defeat of more pointed political rhetoric. The right also divides on
20
diversity. Some conservative observers attack it as pernicious; others
21
extol it; still others propose that diversity be applied to new
22
interventions. To date, no robust account of the diversity rationale—a
defense of it that persons disadvantaged by its use can see the reasoning
23
behind —has been published. In this Article, I set out to fill the void.

18. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354–55 n.3 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see Delgado, supra
note 16.
19. Sumi K. Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the Diversity Dilemma, 68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1035,
1052–53 (1997); Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 Va. L. Rev. 697, 733–34 (1999)
(book review).
20. See, e.g., Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism: Principles for a Multiracial Society 335
(1995) (“‘[M]anaging [workplace] diversity’ is an ideological movement masquerading as a booster of
corporate performance.”); Peter W. Wood, Diversity: The Invention of a Concept 145 (2003)
(“[D]iversity [as practiced in higher education] . . . is intellectually threadbare and ethically
contemptible.”); Roger Clegg, Why I’m Sick of the Praise for Diversity on Campuses, Chron. Higher
Educ., Jul. 14, 2000, at B8 (attacking diversity as contrary to merit).
21. Responding to the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision on affirmative action at the University of
Michigan, see infra Part I.B., President George W. Bush declared, “I strongly support diversity of all
kinds, including racial diversity in higher education.” Neil A. Lewis, Bush and Affirmative Action:
Constitutional Questions; President Faults Race Preferences as Admission Tool, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
2003, at A1 [hereinafter Bush Statement]; see also infra note 22 and accompanying text (implicitly
endorsing diversity).
22. Nominees for new diversity categories include religion, see Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different
Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and Affirmative Action’s Destiny, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 811, 862 (1998);
viewpoints, see James Lindgren, Conceptualizing Diversity in Empirical Terms, 23 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. 5, 10 (2005); and conservatives in the academy, see Gary McCaleb, For the Human Rights
Campaign, Diversity Is Not Enough (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/11/
for_the_human_rights_campaign_diversity_is_not_enough.html.
23. See Adversity.Net, http://www.adversity.net (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (website established
“for victims of reverse discrimination”). Assessments of affirmative action that focus on persons who
feel harmed by its interventions include Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination
Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis (1980) (reaching no conclusion on the question of
justification); Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same Sin?, 67 Denv. U. L. Rev. 421, 422 (1990)
(“As a result of affirmative action programs, marginally qualified white males rapidly are replacing
black females as the group most frequently discriminated against in American society.”); Lisa Newton,
Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified, 83 Ethics 308, 312 (1973) (arguing that benign discrimination is
no better than the invidious discrimination that preceded it). For more recent work in this vein, see
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action and
Reparations, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 683, 690 n.20 (2004) (gathering sources).
Proponents of diversity occasionally state or imply that diversity does no harm. See, e.g.,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (concluding that a challenged affirmative action program
in a state university “does not unduly harm nonminority applicants”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (declaring that a hypothetical individual whose competitor enjoyed “a
‘plus’ on the basis of ethnic background” has “no basis to complain of unequal treatment” even if he
has lost “the last available seat”); Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action FAQs, Univ. of
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Claiming that diversity may be justified calls for not only an
investigation of how the diversity rationale functions in contemporary
American law, but also of the verb “to justify” itself. Justification, the
noun form, holds particular sway in criminal and tort law. When
functioning as a defense, it tells a victim that the detriment she suffered
will not be condemned by the courts because inflicting that harm was the
24
correct course for the defendant. Justifying diversity, consistent with
justification elsewhere in the law, ought also to address harmed
25
individuals.
26
Human beings with names and life plans—Allan Bakke, Barbara
27
28
29
30
Grutter, Abigail Fisher, Jennifer Gratz, Frank Ricci, and Sharon
31
Taxman, among others—gained attention from the Supreme Court
when they objected to governmental actions that focused detrimentally
on a characteristic of theirs recognized by civil rights law. They won
32
certiorari, a scarce prize. Diversity rationales helped the institutional
opponents they accused, just as self-defense helps human defendants
accused of homicide and other crimes.

Iowa, Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, http://www.uiowa.edu/~eod/searches/manual/
FAQ/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Isn’t affirmative action a form of reverse discrimination?
No. . . . Learning to value the contributions of women and minorities requires a change in how we
think.”); Equal Employment Opportunity Diversity Frequently Asked Questions, National Archives,
http://www.archives.gov/eeo/policy/diversity-faq.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Is there a cost benefit
to Diversity? We can obtain a cost benefit by measuring such things as improved employee morale,
lower turnover rates, higher productivity, fewer hiring costs, and decrease in absenteeism.”). In this
Article, I stipulate that the diversity rationale for affirmative action can cause individuals to suffer
detriment. See infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
24. “A defendant who raises a justification defense in a criminal prosecution says, in essence, ‘I
did nothing wrong for which I should be punished.’” Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A
Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 Wayne L. Rev. 1155, 1161 (1987). The exemplar of
a justification in criminal law is self-defense. Id. at 1161–63 n.22.
25. By “harmed individuals” I mean persons who complain in court about a specific instance of
detriment linked to an affirmative action program, not members of dominant groups who feel
burdened by affirmative action in the larger society. The latter cohort may have suffered no harm. See
generally Fred L. Pincus, Reverse Discrimination: Dismantling the Myth (2003) (arguing that
resentment of affirmative action among white men stems from their feeling powerlessness about
income and employment patterns rather than prejudice against them for being male and white).
26. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
27. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
28. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 21,
2012) (No. 11-345).
29. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
30. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 577, 563 (2009).
31. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521
U.S. 1117 (1997).
32. Christine M. Macey, Referral Is Not Required: How Inexperienced Supreme Court Advocates
Can Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations, 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 979, 983 n.33 (2009) (noting that in a
typical Supreme Court term, the odds of gaining certiorari after filing a petition are about one in a
hundred).
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As used in court to defend policies that discriminate, the diversity
rationale seems to regard injury to plaintiffs as collateral damage and not
33
very interesting or important. But whenever an action, especially an
action taken as policy by the state, has imposed harm on persons who
have done nothing wrong—turned them away from a job, perhaps, or
denied them admission to a selective school—courts that leave this harm
unrectified ought to say why. “We had to hurt you for the sake of
diversity” is unsatisfactory because it does not tell injured persons
enough. If diversity may be justified, then litigants who experienced
detriment and then lost in court can receive what the law has owed them
all along: a principled reckoning.
Until this explanation emerges, rationales for diversity will resemble
34
excuses more than justifications. Diversity differs from criminal-defense
excuses in one central respect: Criminal-defense excuses, which dispute
the blameworthiness of the defendant, always admit that the conduct had
bad effects. Proponents of diversity do not describe what they pursue as
harm. Diversity, sings the chorus, is good. Consistent with the criminal35
defense understanding of excuses as involuntary, however, defenses of
diversity sidestep basic questions of accountability and agency.
A judge reading a complaint about an affirmative action scheme
might wonder which individuals installed the diversity goal in question,
when the diversity-motivated policy became potent enough in practice to
vex persons in the circumstances of the petitioner and, should diversity
ever prove unproductive for the defendant in the future, who holds the
key to turn this engine off. The diversity rationale in its current form
takes no interest in the origins of conscious designs by individuals. Like
excuse, it emerges in court as an ambient condition rather than a choice
that urged decisionmakers to act in a particular way because acting that
way was the correct thing for them to do.
The most striking similarity between criminal-defense excuses and
diversity is what they lack: Both reach the judiciary with no claim that
the challenged behavior honored a moral, legal, or political imperative. A
criminal defendant who says that a condition like intoxication or duress
should excuse conduct on her part—conduct that both fulfilled the
elements of a crime and injured someone—does not claim that her

33. See infra Part II.B.
34. The excused defendant stands in contrast to the justified defendant, who “emerges from the
resolution of his criminal prosecution with his reputation and character intact.” Elaine M. Chiu,
Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1317, 1331 (2006). A person who acted with
justification did nothing wrong. An excuse, by contrast, acknowledges wrongness: Although it denies
the culpability of an actor, it does not extol his behavior. Excuses include duress, insanity, intoxication,
somnambulism, and mistake as to justification. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A
Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 199, 242–43 (1982). Tort law shares this hierarchy: It
recognizes justifications but not excuses as defenses. Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 157 (2000).
35. Robinson, supra note 34, at 242.
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duress or intoxication deserves approval. The diversity rationale is
almost as timorous. Litigants defend their pursuit as vaguely desirable
rather than necessary.
This Article argues that action taken in the name of diversity should
be examined with reference to ideals. Which circumstances justify
beneficent classifications of persons based on conditions they did not
choose, like their race or sex? What justifies imposing detriments on
36
members of correlative groups such as persons classed as white? My
inquiry acknowledges that in settings where courts recognize diversity as a
rationale for affirmative action—mainly education and the workplace—
37
thin or vague rationales for this intervention can be expedient. Part I of
this Article explores the development of the diversity rationale as it
emerged from the Supreme Court. Working from this foundation, the
Article next explores the advantages of going light on principle or
endorsing diversity as a vague, nonspecific good. When it is not justified—
the condition it is in now—diversity suits the needs of numerous
constituencies and decisionmakers. Part II, subtitled “The Uses of
Blandness,” surveys diversity as an anodyne instrument.
Courts and policymakers need a thick case for diversity too. Once
diversity is justified—not excused or condoned as it is at present—then
distributions made in its name become not only lawful but also
compelling. Individuals might have an enforceable entitlement to
38
particular diversity-driven policies from governments; they might have
standing to demand these measures in court. Interventions done in the
name of diversity that implementers cannot justify, by contrast, misuse
the rationale and constitute wrongful discrimination. To the extent that
implementing diversity remains optional rather than a legal imperative,

36. One might query whether “groups” include cohorts of persons identified by their class and
levels of wealth. If not, why not? See generally Michaels, supra note 15 (arguing that the diversity
rationale for affirmative action functions to bolster inequality and flatter the privileged). I take up—
but certainly do not resolve—this challenge below. See infra Part III.
37. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 912–13 (recognizing the need for implementers to minimize
backlash).
38. Although this Article pays occasional heed to diversity as a Title VII rationale used by private
employers, its assessment of the diversity rationale focuses on state action. When a private-sector
employer imposes detriments in the name of diversity without having once practiced invidious
discrimination in current need of rectification, the rationale becomes harder to justify. See generally
Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Employment After Grutter:
The Case for Containment, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1091, 1145–46 (2006) (“A few sound judicially
crafted exceptions to the equal protection rule for race and more for protected nonrace
characteristics . . . are not per se inconsistent with the text of the Equal Protection Clause. Title VII
exceptions in the statutory text, however, are nonexistent for racial classifications . . . .”). But see
Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1987) (insisting that “taking race
into account” is consistent with Title VII, even if an employer has not undertaken to repair its own
discrimination). My thesis does support amending, or even repealing, civil rights statutes that ban
every kind of unequal treatment based on a person’s membership in a codified list of groups. See
generally infra Part V.C (discussing implications for government decisionmakers).
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decisionmakers ought to reflect on robust versions of this choice along
with the anodyne construct that now prevails.
Robust versions of the choice—that is, diversity justified—can
emerge at two levels. Part III examines the first, and more familiar, level.
It equates antisubordination with corrective and distributive justice.
Here diversity is a manifestation as well as an end in itself; it is what
results from interventions that strive to repair group-based historical
injustice. Part IV, recognizing that in contemporary American courts
antisubordination is a nonstarter, explores how diversity resembles other
ideals and precepts that pervade contemporary law and government. The
analogues gathered in this Part can justify diversity even for those who
lack or renounce any commitment to antisubordination.
Arrayed to enlarge support for the diversity rationale, these ideals
widen the base on which a diversity rationale rests. They are means as
well as ends. Part V concludes the Article by reviewing the diversity
rationale with reference to choices for institutions and governments.
Affirmative action in this last Part is literally action when diversity
functions to put agendas into effect. Once it is understood as principled,
diversity can guide—rather than merely rationalize—the conduct of state
actors who seek fidelity to both justice and equal protection of the laws.

I. Diversity Enters Doctrine
A. Five Votes in REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. BAKKE
Neither party has prevailed, announced the U.S. Supreme Court in
39
the great affirmation action dispute of its 1977 Term. All nine Justices
voted. Harry Blackmun, William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and
Byron White sided with the Regents of the University of California,
which had set aside for minority applicants sixteen places in a hundredstudent medical school class at the Davis campus. The four signed a joint
opinion; three of them wrote separately as well. Warren Burger, Potter
Stewart, William Rehnquist, and John Paul Stevens sided with the
plaintiff-respondent, a white man who had been refused admission to the
medical school class. Omitting reference to the Constitution, this group
40
relied on Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The ninth Justice, Lewis Powell, rejected three rationales proffered
by the University of California in defense of its affirmative action plan—
rectifying the disproportionately low number of minority medical
students, countering the effects of societal discrimination, and trying to
41
provide underserved communities with physicians —before finding one

39. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
40. Id. at 417–18 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
41. Michele S. Moses & Mitchell J. Chang, Toward a Deeper Understanding of the Diversity
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that he could endorse: Universities, Powell concluded, have a compelling
42
interest in what he called “beneficial educational pluralism.” Two
sentences that Powell composed were acceptable to Blackmun, Brennan,
Marshall, and White. They formed Part V-C of his opinion, the only
passage in Bakke to win a majority of votes:
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant,
however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a
substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly
devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California
court’s judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the
43
race of any applicant must be reversed.

How could any governmental “consideration of race and ethnic
origin” of a person be “properly devised”? Justice Powell expounded on
this question, speaking only for himself. Powell contended that variety in
44
a student population generates “speculation, experiment and creation,”
an atmosphere that enhances learning. Multiple “experiences, outlooks,
45
and ideas” in a class of admitted students is an acceptable agenda for a
state-university admissions policy. Because dialogue produced by a
diverse student body relates closely to what institutions teach even when
it takes place outside the classroom, Powell continued, choosing diversity
in admissions is also a matter of academic freedom, “a special concern of
46
the First Amendment.” Powell objected to the Davis policy for its
message to Allan Bakke that because of his racial classification he had
access to one of only eighty-four places, while his “Negro, Asian, or
Chicano” rivals had an “opportunity to compete for every seat in the
47
class,” the full hundred. Too rigid. Yet Powell approved using group
memberships, including race and ethnic origin, to affect distributions
from the State of California.
What Powell meant by diversity has been debated for decades.
Three value judgments pertinent to the law of equal protection underlie
his conclusion. First, heterogeneity is desirable. Second, managers of
institutions must hold prerogatives. Third, quotas are at best troubling, if
48
not flat-out unconstitutional.
Rationale, 35 Educ. Researcher 6, 7 (2006).
42. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317.
43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 312 (1978) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)).
45. Id. at 314.
46. Id. at 312.
47. Id. at 319–20.
48. Michael Selmi draws similar conclusions, omitting the one about managerial prerogative:
[I]f one wants to know what the law on affirmative action was then or is now, the best place
to look would be Justice Powell’s opinion, where one would learn that race can be used as
one factor among many; quotas are constitutionally impermissible while goals are
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These three positions—each of them pointedly silent about
segregation and subordination—became the Bakke that endured, making
49
the Powell opinion a landmark. Pre-Bakke case law on integration,
50
stretching back even before Brown v. Board of Education, had affirmed
51
the value of what Powell would later call “a diverse student body,” but
always with reference to repair. Older cases construing the Equal
Protection Clause to support desegregation measures had made
52
reference to unlawful adversity that judges traced to enslavement.
The University of California, however, had embraced race-based
affirmative action not to rectify any admitted-to discrimination in its past,
but to enhance its present and future. A policy measure that imposes
detriment and benefit on individuals based on a protected characteristic,
installed by an entity without simultaneously asserting that it has any
historical wrong to repair, characterizes affirmative action as
contemporary judges approve it. Post-Bakke case law illustrates the
phenomenon.
B. Post-BAKKE Diversity
After enlisting four colleagues to sign onto his two careful
sentences, Justice Powell went on to construe his innovation narrowly.
One year after Bakke, he disagreed with the Court’s approval of a
comprehensive desegregation plan. In his view, the scheme usurped
53
prerogatives that belonged to parents and local school authorities: “The
primary and continuing responsibility for public education, including the
bringing about and maintaining of desired diversity, must be left with
54
school officials and public authorities.” When a majority of his
colleagues approved minority set-aside legislation in 1980, Powell wrote

acceptable; preference programs cannot be used to remedy societal discrimination; no racial
classification may be treated as benign; and the role model theory will not justify a program,
even though a diverse student body may serve as a compelling justification.
Michael Selmi, The Life of Bakke: An Affirmative Action Retrospective, 87 Geo. L.J. 981, 999 (1999)
(citations omitted).
49. Joshua P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.
437, 444 (2011) (“[B]efore Bakke, the notion that diversity could be a compelling governmental
interest was never suggested.”).
50. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. Among the harbingers of diversity as a compelling interest was Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 401 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (observing that a desegregated classroom
can “prepare students to live in a pluralistic society”).
52. Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 577, 593 (2009) (“In
Sweatt [v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)] and McLaurin [v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher
Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)], . . . we see the Court’s allusion to the democratic and social benefits
flowing from a racially diverse student body.”).
53. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Pinnick, 443 U.S. 449, 479 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 489.
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separately to defend this measure as very different from the Bakke
intervention that he had voted against: Fullilove v. Klutznick, he said,
rested on detailed findings by Congress that established the necessity of
55
favoring minority contractors. Powell never made diversity central to
another decision before retiring in 1987, nine years after his remarkable
articulation of a rationale.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor took up the diversity baton. In
56
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, which found the need to furnish
role models for minority children insufficient to support favoring
minorities in layoffs, O’Connor suggested that the diversity rationale
could have made a difference: Role models and diversity are very
different goals, she wrote in a footnote to her concurrence, and the
school board had unfortunately omitted diversity in its lower-court
57
arguments.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, when the Court held for the first time that
diversity is a compelling interest that justifies race-conscious measures by
58
a state actor, Justice O’Connor wrote the 5–4 majority opinion. Grutter
permitted the University of Michigan Law School to consider race in
admissions. Expanding Justice Powell’s appreciation for discursive
breadth within education, the Grutter majority extolled diversity as
central to preparing students for life in society and even to “the
59
legitimacy of American government.” Justice O’Connor cited an amicus
brief, signed by military leaders, to support her conclusion that diversity
60
is a matter of national security.
Diversity in the Supreme Court has only held steady, rather than
gained, after the leap forward of Grutter. The diversity rationale was not
61
strong enough to save affirmative action plans challenged in 2007 and
62
2009. Although both cases were losses for affirmative action, they
63
honored the diversity rationale. And there are no rival rationales for

55. 448 U.S. 448, 516–17 (1980).
56. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
57. Id. at 289.
58. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
59. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1767, 1770 (2004).
60. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331.
61. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
62. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 577, 563 (2009).
63. In Parents Involved, the Court noted that defendant school districts had failed to show that
racial classifications were necessary to attain the diversity they sought. 551 U.S. at 724–25. Ricci, in
which the word “diversity” does not appear, held that a city government could not throw out
firefighter tests whose white takers had performed better out of fear of disparate-impact liability in
future litigation brought by minority test-takers. 557 U.S. at 563. Ricci nevertheless left room for
positive discrimination in the future: A state actor may practice race-conscious affirmative action,
wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy, when it has “a strong basis in evidence” to support its worry about
liability. Id.
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affirmative action: “Racial classification” and “racial balance,” for
64
example, are terms of opprobrium to the Court.
Meanwhile, lower courts have approved and extended the diversity
rationale for workplace affirmative action in the context of law
enforcement. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Chicago, “a racially and
ethnically divided major city,” needed diversity—more minorities at the
sergeant level of its police force—to enhance community trust and
65
cooperation with law enforcement. Ruling against an aggrieved white
police officer who was not given a promotion to inspector, a federal trial
court nevertheless commended diversity as a stated goal for the
66
defendant city to pursue.

II. An Anodyne Rationale, or, The Uses of Blandness
Quoting a remark attributed to Randall Kennedy, James Lindgren
67
once wrote that “[n]o one really believes in diversity.” Proponents who
defend diversity have “asserted a rationale they didn’t believe,” Lindgren
continued, “because, after Bakke, diversity was all that was left to
68
support affirmative action.” In a much-cited article, Sanford Levinson
has claimed that the Supreme Court uses diversity to play the game of
Simon Says: When “Simon says, ‘Start talking about diversity—and
downplay any talk about rectification of past social injustice,’ then the
69
conversation proceeds exactly in that direction.”
If diversity doesn’t address past social injustice, what then does it
address? If the term means nothing, why is it popular? Vagueness
accompanying this word might be, as the tech phrase goes, not a bug but
a feature. This Part contends that diversity as accepted by the Supreme
Court covertly expands the prerogatives of individuals who manage large
institutions.
Other uses of the diversity rationale paste smiley faces on a
complicated record. As Justice Thomas observed trenchantly in his
Grutter dissent, enthusiasts do not have good evidence to support their
70
assertion that instilling diversity causes positive social consequences.
Another criticism, attributed above to Levinson but articulated earlier by

64. Nelson, supra note 52, at 593.
65. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114–15 (7th Cir. 2003). A pre-Grutter decision from
the same court, authored by Judge Posner, had approved the favoring of an African-American
applicant to the position of lieutenant in an Illinois “boot camp” correctional facility; the court
concluded that the facility “would not succeed in its mission of pacification and reformation with as
white a staff as it would have had if a black male had not been appointed to one of the lieutenant
slots.” Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996).
66. See generally Dietz v. Baker, 523 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 2007).
67. Lindgren, supra note 22, at 5.
68. Id.
69. Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 573, 578 (2000).
70. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 355 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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other scholars, is that diversity rhetoric muffles well-founded complaints
71
about subordination and puts bland good cheer in their place. In this
vein, this Part discusses three such anodyne uses of diversity: managerial
prerogative, happy empirical claims, and papering over subordination.
These uses of diversity as a vague, nonspecific good certainly serve
various agendas. They may even achieve good effects. But they do not
justify the diversity rationale.
A. Diversity as a Prerogative for Managers
Both proponents of diversity and scholars of affirmative action
doctrine have remarked on the enthusiasm for diversity held by
American businesses. Prominent corporations have articulated their
steadfast support of this value. They have filed amicus briefs laden with
72
praise for diversity. In “A Statement of Principle,” the chief legal
officers of five hundred publicly traded companies endorsed diversity in
the sense considered here. Refuting any notion that diversity efforts
belong to the left, big business has stood unwaveringly for this precept in
73
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Employers do not limit their embrace of diversity to amicus briefs
and pledges. One report, published in the New York Times as an
advertising supplement, offered lively features from about two dozen
large companies (including the Times itself) telling how they integrate
74
diversity into their operations. Several use diversity as a yardstick when
75
dealing with vendors and suppliers.
Businesses that celebrate diversity do not, however, explore
whether these initiatives have led to quantifiable improvements in the
76
short term or in their profits over time. They describe diversity more
77
with adjectives than numbers. Although announcements of cost-cutting

71. See infra Part II.B.
72. Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Segregation, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 599, 632
(2011); David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to “Diversity Is Good for Business”:
The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 1548, 1576 (2004).
73. Garda, supra note 72 (reviewing amicus briefs filed in Grutter and Parents Involved). See
generally Frank Dobbin, Inventing Equal Opportunity (2009) (arguing that workplace affirmative
action originated in managers’ decisions rather than law-based imperatives).
74. See Jason Forsythe, Leading with Diversity, N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/marketing/
jobmarket/diversity (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
75. See Anjali Chavan, The “Charles Morgan Letter” and Beyond: The Impact of Diversity
Initiatives on Big Law, 23 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 521, 524–27 (2010) (citing statements issued by WalMart and General Electric).
76. Fay Hansen, Diversity’s Business Case Doesn’t Add up, Workforce, Apr. 2003, at 28.
77. See David G. Embrick, The Diversity Ideology in the Business World: A New Oppression for a
New Age, 37 Critical Soc. 541, 541 (2011) (arguing, based on interviews with Fortune 1000 managers,
that corporate leaders who endorse diversity as policy cannot “effectively elaborate on their company’s
diversity policies or practices”).
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measures emerge routinely from corporate public relations offices and
investors associate cost-cutting moves (including layoffs) with positive
prospects for the stock price, no publicly traded corporation appears to
have ever revealed its decision to abandon a diversity initiative on the
ground that it did not pay. Diversity programs in big business sometimes
78
wane, but they appear internally unscrutinized as sources of gain or loss.
Writers who have noted diversity-enthusiasm within American business
79
have also failed to say just why the cheering persists.
It might seem odd that a for-profit corporation would pour time and
money into an initiative without concern for its bottom line. Once
diversity is understood as a prerogative, however—an option that derives
from and demonstrates power—the investment starts to make sense
regardless of the results it achieves: “Organizations like having the
flexibility of not being put in a box about whether this does or doesn’t
80
work,” as a diversity consultant once put the point. Because private
entities have more freedom than government actors to sort by groupbased characteristics, managers know that whatever position they
espouse on diversity—for, against, a little, a lot—will likely remain
optional. To the extent that employee morale and external perceptions
affect corporate performance, an embrace of diversity will please several
constituencies. It will also avoid the controversy that vexes affirmative
action measures described in reparative terms.
Hence my hypothesis: Other things being equal, diversity as policy
gives more prerogatives to individuals who make personnel decisions.
Diversity-as-prerogative appeals not only to private-sector business
leaders, but also to managers serving as state actors—like Lee Bollinger,
for example, who as president of the University of Michigan found his
name after the v. in two Supreme Court decisions that examined the
81
diversity rationale. Just as corporation managers do not tally up what
exactly diversity does for a company’s market capitalization, human
resources operations, stock price, or capacity to shift in response to new

78. When researchers at MIT’s Sloan School of Management approached more than twenty
Fortune 500 companies to review their diversity efforts, only four said yes. Thomas Kochan et al., The
Effects of Diversity on Business Performance: Report of the Diversity Research Network, 42 Hum.
Resources Mgmt. 1, 7–8 (2003). Permission from chief executive officers did not assure participation,
and the four companies that went along with the study came to it with longstanding relationships with
individual researchers. Id.
79. Explanations have been superficial. See, e.g., Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Race Experts: How
Racial Etiquette, Sensitivity Training, and New Age Therapy Hijacked the Civil Rights
Revolution 164 (2001) (attributing diversity enthusiasm to concern about international
competitiveness); Andrew Ferguson, Chasing Rainbows, Washingtonian, Apr. 1994, at 35, 38
(claiming that businesses installed diversity training as litigation prophylaxis to look better, should
they face discrimination complaints).
80. Hansen, supra note 76, at 30 (quoting the president and CEO of a diversity consultancy).
81. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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82

developments, persons who make decisions about diversity in the public
sector have manifested no desire to gather facts when these facts might
tie their hands.
Evidence for the prerogatives hypothesis includes the early-adopter
embrace of diversity by one extraordinarily conservative lawyer and
83
judge. Justice Powell came to Bakke having “forthrightly rejected the
idea that blacks had suffered injustice,” writes legal historian Anders
84
Walker. He even “seemed to believe that whites had themselves
become something of a discrete and insular minority, confounded by
85
their black peers and menaced by Soviets abroad.” In 1966, Powell
condemned peaceful civil disobedience as practiced by Martin Luther
86
King, Jr. as “lawless and indefensible.” A few years later, convinced
that “the New Left, the liberal media, rebellious students on college
campuses and, most important, Ralph Nader” gravely threatened the
87
American economic system, Powell launched from his law practice what
became “the business community’s campaign to transform the Supreme
88
Court.” For Justice Powell this intersection—African Americans have
no entitlement to redress for injustice meets managerial capitalism needs
more freedom from constraint—made diversity-as-prerogative an
89
attractive strategy, congruent with conservatism. Unlike affirmative
action as a technology of repair, diversity recognizes no entitlement
based on historical injury. It permits power holders to do as they please.

82. See Hansen, supra note 76.
83. See generally Janet L. Blasecki, Justice Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch
Conservative?, 52 J. Pol. 530 (1990) (reviewing Justice Powell’s votes). Powell is often recalled as a
moderate. See id. After one removes his Bakke opinion for this purpose, however, Powell’s sole liberal
stance of any note is his 1973 vote reading the Fourteenth Amendment to limit what a state may
criminalize with respect to abortion. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 346 (1994)
(recounting Roe v. Wade as an aberration for Powell). On the rest of the record, see Terri Peretti,
Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 273 passim (2010)
(describing Powell as central to Richard Nixon’s conservative “Southern strategy”).
84. Anders Walker, Diversity’s Strange Career: Recovering the Racial Pluralism of Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., 50 Santa Clara L. Rev. 647, 673 (2010).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 669 (citing Lewis F. Powell, Jr., A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 205, 207 (1966)).
87. Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc., N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 18, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html.
88. Id.
89. Sanford Levinson notes that when Powell adverted to the First Amendment in support of the
diversity rationale, see Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978) (“[U]niversities
must be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the ‘robust
exchange of ideas.’”), he envisioned a prerogative rather than a mandate. For example, employees
certainly take diverse positions on whether a union would be desirable and on “general economic
concerns, such as the relationship between globalization and job security or the future of the welfare
state,” but businesses remain free to oppose First Amendment-style diversity with respect to a robust
exchange of ideas. Levinson, supra note 69, at 589–90.
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The prerogatives hypothesis also comports with the civil rights
history observation that diversity started to flourish after it gained a
foothold among key personnel in both education and employment
90
following the decline of reparations-focused affirmative action.
According to this thesis, the Reagan presidency brought transition to
affirmative action in the 1980s. Executive and judicial branches of the
U.S. government withdrew from commitments to affirmative action, a
91
stance that continued with the Clinton administration. Foreseeing that
affirmative action would fare poorly in the courts, human resources and
university administrators switched to a more palatable and flexible
alternative. Victories in Bakke and Grutter, though narrow, confirmed
the soundness of a palatability strategy: The transmutation of
92
antisubordination into diversity has endured.
What is interesting about this thesis is the question it does not
explore: What appeal does diversity hold for individuals who govern
universities and places of employment? Why do they bother? Diversity
postures undoubtedly are cheaper and less controversial than affirmative
action, but those virtues do not explain how diversity is better for
decisionmakers than doing nothing at all—nothing, that is to say, except
trying to comply with antidiscrimination law. Managerial prerogative is
an answer to this question about incentives for decisionmakers.
More support for the prerogative hypothesis comes from the
conservative origins of race-based affirmative action in the United
93
States. Conventional wisdom sites the liberal beginnings of affirmative
94
action policy in a 1961 executive order from President John F. Kennedy.
In the Republican administration preceding Kennedy’s, however, a
commission led by Vice President Richard M. Nixon determined that
private employers had not been doing enough to ensure equal
90. See, e.g., Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action Became Diversity Management:
Employer Response to Antidiscrimination Law, 1961 to 1996, 41 Am. Behav. Scientist 960, 961–62
(1998) (focusing on equal employment and affirmative action managers in corporations); Daniel N.
Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management
at UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-Madison, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 985, 986–88 (2007) (identifying
university officials as the source of strength for diversity). For discussion of the personnel thesis in a
third venue, see Jiannbin Lee Shiao, Identifying Talent, Institutionalizing Diversity: Race and
Philanthropy in Post-Civil Rights America (2005) (describing foundations and other nonprofits).
91. Kelly & Dobbin, supra note 90, at 971–75.
92. See infra Part III.
93. See Benton Williams, AT&T and the Private-Sector Origins of Private-Sector Affirmative
Action, 20 J. Pol’y Hist. 542, 543–44 (2008).
94. See supra note 1. On whether Kennedy ought to be remembered as liberal, compare John F.
Kennedy, Acceptance of the New York Liberal Party Nomination (Sept. 14, 1960), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/jfk-nyliberal (“I’m proud to
say I’m a Liberal.”), with John F. Kennedy, Conservapedia, http://www.conservapedia.com/
John_F._Kennedy (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“Kennedy was basically a conservative, but he had to
appeal to a primarily liberal base, so he offered symbols for the liberals while following a conservative
course in foreign and domestic policy.”).
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employment opportunity —a finding that presupposes some voluntary
affirmative action by business in the pre-civil rights era. Like Powell,
whom he appointed to the Supreme Court, Nixon endorsed managerial
96
prerogative. And like their successor-leaders within American business,
managers in this pre-civil rights period supported versions of affirmative
97
action that preserved their freedom to make decisions.
Court-fashioned equal protection doctrine that condemns quotas
offers yet more support for the prerogatives hypothesis. Unless one
accepts managerial prerogative as a good thing, it becomes hard to say just
what about an affirmative-action plan that demands quotas for minorities
offends the Equal Protection Clause when a no-quotas plan would not. In
the construct now ascendant, the Constitution permits state actors to
98
impose detriments on white persons because of their race and men
99
because of their sex but only as long as flexibility—or what might be
called vagueness, non-accountability, or even arbitrariness and caprice—
accompanies this discrimination. Quotas, which constrain discretion by the
100
state, appear to comport better than flexibility with the rule of law.
Diversity doctrine nevertheless perceives the quota, an approach to
101
affirmative action that curbs prerogative, as unconstitutional.
B. Happy Empirical Claims
Launching the diversity rationale for affirmative action, Justice
Powell endorsed the proposition that diversity causes desirable social
consequences by reprinting, as an appendix to his opinion, a summary of
102
an admissions policy in use at Harvard University. The president of
Harvard at the time that Bakke was decided, Derek Bok, went on to say
more about the uses of diversity in higher education in a much-cited
book co-authored with William G. Bowen, who had served as president
103
at Princeton when Bok led Harvard. Bok and Bowen, working with an

95. Yuill, supra note 1, at 36.
96. See John David Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action: Politics, Culture, and
Justice in America 177–221 (1996) (exploring Nixon’s motives).
97. See Yuill, supra note 1, at 37; see also Terry H. Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A
History of Affirmative Action 12 (2004) (noting partial acceptance of a racial quota imposed on
federal contractors by the Public Works Administration in 1933).
98. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343–44 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
99. Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987).
100. See Frederick F. Schauer, Profiles, Probabilities, and Stereotypes 276 (2003) (“When ‘the
rule of law’ is contrasted with the ‘rule of men,’ the core idea is that individual power, creativity,
initiative, and discretion have their dark side.”); see also Jonathan Turley, Ten Reasons We’re No
Longer the Land of the Free, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 2012, at B1 (expressing misgivings about
governmental “unchecked powers resting on the hope that they will be used wisely”).
101. Selmi, supra note 48, at 999.
102. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321.
103. William G. Bowen & Derek Bok, The Shape of the River: Long-Term Consequences of
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enormous data set, declared that affirmative action in elite higher
education had enhanced the welfare of both minority students and their
104
white classmates.
The Shape of the River spurred other researchers post-Bakke to
105
investigate the effects of diversity in higher education. Studies cited by
the Court in Grutter helped to build the constitutional-law rule that
106
pursuing diversity is a compelling government interest. Compelling,
explained Justice O’Connor, because exposure to diversity breaks down
stereotypes and fosters better understanding of groups; a classroom
107
cannot have too much “variety of backgrounds.” Because graduates of
diverse institutions emerge better prepared to navigate employment
relationships and remunerative activities in a global economy, O’Connor
continued, the rationale that supports affirmative action in education
108
carries over into the workforce and even national security.
Post-Grutter measurements of diversity as a source of social gains
continue. Although studies also link diversity in the workplace to gains in
109
employees’ productivity, creativity, and quality of decisions reached,
education continues to occupy the lion’s share of this research. Findings

Considering Race in College and University Admissions xxi–xxviii (1998). In February 2012, the
U.S. Department of Education reported that it was investigating complaints about race-based
preferences at both Harvard and Princeton. See Peter Schmidt, Harvard Faces New Scrutiny over
Alleged Bias Against Asian-American Applicants, Ticker (Feb. 2, 2012, 10:59 AM), http://chronicle.com/
blogs/ticker/harvard-faces-new-scrutiny-over-alleged-bias-against-asian-americans.
104. The famed monograph reported on outcomes experienced by more than 80,000 persons who
had entered elite institutions as undergraduates in 1951, 1976, and 1989. Bowen & Bok, supra note 103,
at 276. “It is not often that empirical research settles any important question of public policy,” wrote
Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer, explaining that this book established “a remarkable increase, as a
result of [affirmative action in elite-college admissions], in the number of blacks playing important
roles in American society, gaining higher incomes, influencing their communities.” Nathan Glazer, A
Place for Racial Preferences, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1998, at A19.
105. See, e.g., Compelling Interest: Examining the Evidence on Racial Dynamics in Colleges
and Universities (Mitchell J. Chang et al. eds., 2003); Defending Diversity: Affirmative Action at
the University of Michigan (Patricia Gurin et al. eds., 2004); Diversity Challenged: Evidence of
the Impact of Affirmative Action (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001).
106. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–31 (2003).
107. Id. at 330.
108. Id. at 331.
109. See generally Carol P. Harvey & M. June Allard, Understanding and Managing
Diversity (5th ed. 2011) (summarizing current research); Scott E. Page, The Difference: How the
Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies 314 (2007) (reporting on
formal, mathematically stated studies that found a positive relation between the “cognitive diversity”
of membership in a group and the quality of decisions the group reaches). One example of how
cognitive diversity succeeded occurred during World War II, when English cryptographers were finally
able to crack a difficult German code by adding new groups of people to their code-breaking team:
mathematicians, scientists, classists, chess grand masters, and crossword addicts. Frans Johansson,
The Medici Effect: What Elephants and Epidemics Can Teach Us About Innovation 79 (2006).
But see Cris Wildermuth & Susan Gray, Diversity Training 16–17 (2005) (stating that the high
productivity of demographically heterogeneous groups in the workplace is a myth).
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about diversity in education have been overwhelmingly positive; new
111
benefits ascribed to it continue to emerge in this literature.
Many empirical claims about diversity—though by no means all—rest
112
on a shaky foundation. One flaw marring several studies is that in higher
education at least, and probably also in other contexts that engage the
diversity rationale, trying to demonstrate that diverse environments cause
welfare gains is confounded by self-selection into these environments.
Researchers cannot readily distinguish causes from effects. Persons
already open to democratic engagement, creative thinking, learning from
new people, and other results that researchers have linked to diversity
initiatives might have sought diversity out and would have found it if the
113
environments they chose had not offered it to them. This population will
turn up overrepresented in settings like integrated campus housing, college
114
courses that attract diverse enrollments, and multicultural workplaces.

110. Mitchell J. Chang, Quality Matters: Achieving Benefits Associated with Racial Diversity
9 (2011) (“It is nearly impossible to find a published study grounded in the field of higher education
research that rejects Justice Powell’s diversity rationale.”); Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of
the Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at
Selective Higher Educational Institutions, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 1229, 1243 n.43 (2008) (“Academic opinion
is solidly behind the tremendous benefits of diversity for the education of all students.”). In other work,
Chang casts his findings about the benefits of diversity in a two-step analysis: First, white students who
attend diverse schools are more likely than white students who attend nondiverse schools to socialize
with nonwhite peers; from there, “socializing with someone of a different racial group . . . contributes
to the student’s academic development, satisfaction with college, level of cultural awareness, and
commitment to promoting racial understanding.” Mitchell J. Chang & Alexander W. Astin, Who
Benefits from Diversity in Higher Education?, Diversity Dig., http://www.diversityweb.org/digest/
w97/research.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (summarizing findings by Chang).
111. One study published in late 2011, for example, reported that “exposure to [fellow] students of
diverse backgrounds” makes it more likely that a student will return to school after freshman year, and
increases critical thinking. Dan Berrett, What Spurs Students to Stay in College and Learn? Good
Teaching Practices and Diversity, Chron. of Higher Educ. (Nov. 6, 2011, 12:55 PM), http://chronicle.
com/article/What-Spurs-Students-to-Stay-in/129670.
112. Stanley Rothman et al., Does Enrollment Diversity Improve University Education?, 15 Int’l J.
Pub. Opinion Res. 8 (2003) (critiquing the methodology of studies that link diversity in higher
education with positive effects, and finding that when methodological flaws are corrected, the gains
mostly vanish).
113. The absence of an agreed-on definition of diversity adds to this problem. Imagine a white
student who puts a high value on racial diversity finding herself on a virtually all-white college campus
in a mostly-white town. The student objects to this racial composition, but agrees reluctantly to enroll
when her parents tell her they will pay tuition to no other school. She might generate some racial
diversity in her social life through off-campus initiatives, and cultivate diversity on fronts other than
race—income, sexual orientation, ability/disability—among her peers at school. If after a year or two
at college she fits the profile of a diversity-enhanced student, what gets the credit? Published
multivariate regressions in the diversity literature offer no hypothesis that I have located.
114. Classmates at the same school, less committed to integration, will in turn be underrepresented
in these environments. See generally Note, Educational Benefits Realized: Universities’ PostAdmissions Policies and the Diversity Rationale, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 572, 572–73 (2010) (arguing that
universities practicing affirmative action in admissions should be required to promote interaction
among diverse groups post-enrollment).
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Individuals emerge from diverse environments manifesting the traits they
115
came in with.
Aware of the self-selection problem, researchers have attempted to
116
install controls, but their efforts have been mostly unavailing. A
randomized study of diversity in higher education—where, for example,
cohorts would be forced into diverse versus non-diverse dormitories, or
compelled to enroll or not enroll in certain courses—could get around
self-selection but would clash with customs, if not rules, that assign
prerogatives to students. Schools willing to challenge this tradition would
need not only student cooperation but also approval of their study design
117
from their institutional review boards before they could proceed. Even
118
if a review board would approve the study, which seems unlikely, only
an eccentric institution would seek to be known for taking away choice in
campus housing or course selection.
Moving beyond education into diversity in other settings, diversity
research has relied on surveys, confounded by a fundamental problem
with self-reported data: survey signaling. Respondents to questionnaires
may suppose that paeans to diversity will meet with approval, and that
expressing skepticism or distaste will come across as bigotry and give
119
offense. A presumed right answer to the questions emerges. Even when
participants respond sincerely, they may drift into a position they deem

115. One study exemplifies this problem. The University of Michigan set up an Intergroup
Relations Program, inviting first-year undergraduates to enroll. Patricia Gurin et al., The Benefits of
Diversity in Education for Democratic Citizenship, 60 J. Soc. Issues 17, 20 (2004). Key features of this
optional program included intergroup communication processes in facilitated discussions. Id. at 21.
The authors hypothesized that alumni of this program would score higher than fellow students on
perspective-taking, understanding that difference need not be divisive, perception of
commonalities in values between their own and other groups, mutuality in learning about
their own and other groups, interest in politics, participation in campus politics,
commitment to civic participation after college, and acceptance of conflict as a normal part
of social life.
Id. The prediction came true. Id. at 30.
116. Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking in College
Students, 15 Psychol. Sci. 507, 509 (2004) (describing a controlled study that tested a diversity
intervention which worked effectively around the self-selection problem, but reported a limited
conclusion of small improvements in “integrative complexity”).
117. This constraint applies to all educational institutions that receive federal funding. 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101 (2007).
118. Informed consent from subjects would be virtually impossible to obtain, and enrolling
students against their will in particular courses or keeping them out of electives they want to take
would risk inflicting hard-to-rectify, if not irreparable, harm. See generally Mark S. Stein & Julian
Savulescu, Welfare Versus Autonomy in Human Subjects Research, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 303 (2011).
119. Two British diversity trainers insist on metrics for the study of a diversity training program in
the workplace apart from survey data of trained employees. Phil Clements & John Jones, The
Diversity Training Handbook: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Changing Attitudes
85 (3d ed. 2008). A private entity might look for “business benefits;” a governmental unit might assess
public perception “or organizational performance against certain criteria. Whatever the measure, it
needs to be specified from the word go.” Id.
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correct or wish they held. Survey respondents who are not trying to
121
please their questioner might be trying to please themselves.
Another problem with the empirical-effects literature about
diversity is the neglected possibility that diversity could cause harm
instead of, or in addition to, good. Researchers who investigate diversity
122
look for welfare gains and often find them. Sometimes they report no
123
gains. When studying higher education, however, most researchers do
124
not look for losses, although negative findings and claims continue to
125
be published.
Time spent in a diverse environment could correlate with bad
effects for an individual: shorter life expectancy, worse physical or
mental health, lower income, less wealth, lower scores on self-assessment
of happiness, or inferior performance in one’s occupation. That diversity

120. Patricia Gurin, an acclaimed researcher of diversity in higher education, summarizes two
studies that may have been marred by this flaw. Patricia Gurin et al., The Educational Value of
Diversity, in Defending Diversity 97, 126 (Patricia Gurin et al. eds., 2004). In the first, a majority of
law students at Harvard and the University of Michigan said that “‘most of their classes were better
because of diversity’ and that they had personally benefited from this diversity.” Id. at 126. When
medical students at Harvard and the University of California at San Francisco medical schools were
asked similar questions, they praised diversity at an even higher rate. Id. at 127. The studies were
published in 2001 and 2003 respectively. See id. at 126–27. Students who filled out the questionnaires
came of age after Bakke had made diversity famous in higher education.
121. See Chang, supra note 110, at 15 (reporting on a study that linked “higher levels of crossracial interactions” with high reports from students about their “self-efficacy, academic skills, and selfchange in their capacity to engage with racial-cultural differences”). Another study, published in the
Journal of the American Medical Association, found that white students attending racially diverse
medical schools rated themselves higher than white students at less diverse schools with respect to
their competence to care for minority patients. Somnath Saha et al., Student Body Racial and Ethnic
Composition and Diversity-Related Outcomes in U.S. Medical Schools, 300 JAMA 1135, 1141 (2008).
These respondents may have assessed their skills correctly; they might also have been rationalizing
their fit inside a school of a particular diversity level, whether low or high.
122. See sources cited supra notes 105, 109–110, 114, 119.
123. See supra note 111.
124. Chang, supra note 110, at 9; Gurin, supra note 120, at 127–29 (observing that the only
scholarly study purporting to find that higher-education diversity causes harm had actually found only
that faculty, students, and administrators were more critical of the quality of education in those
schools that serve larger proportions of African American students); cf. Levinson, supra note 69, at
578 (“[I]t is becoming ever more difficult to find anyone who is willing to say, in public, that
institutional or social homogeneity is a positive good and diversity a substantive harm.”).
125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing
studies that find “heterogeneity actually impairs learning for black students”); Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown
and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 Yale L.J. 1285, 1286 (1992) (observing that African-American
children sometimes fare worse in integrated schools “because of discriminatory tracking programs and
teachers’ negative attitudes toward black children”); cf. John R. Lott, Jr. et al., Peer Effects in
Affirmative Action: Evidence from Law Student Performance, 31 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 7 (2011)
(reporting findings that minority students perform either no better or slightly worse when more fellow
minority groups members are in their classes). One scholar has noted harms to members of minority
groups when minority-majority schools are closed in the name of integration and their students
relocated. Drew S. Days III, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 53,
55 (1992).
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in education taxes racial minorities with an extra shift of work to benefit
the dominant cohort at their school—explaining their culture, assuaging
anxieties, and (in the case of admission to selective schools) reassuring
skeptics that they were qualified applicants—has long struck critics as a
126
plausible drawback. Researchers interested in diversity might be
disinclined to start with a gloomy premise. But any claim that an
intervention enhances welfare is baseless when the claimant has not
considered a contrary possibility. Harms from diversity might be absent
127
in education. They might also be present.
In contrast to their counterparts who study education, researchers of
the workplace have associated diversity with negative effects or no
128
effects at all. One text reports that although numerous studies have
sought to prove the hypothesis that diverse groups in the workplace
produce better outputs than homogeneous ones, all of these efforts have
129
failed. A summary of findings about diversity in employment looked at
multiple facets of diversity and a range of consequences seeking the
impact of diversity on “affective, cognitive, communication, and symbolic
130
131
processes.” It found a mixed record. Researchers also attribute strife
132
and dissonance to working with colleagues perceived as different.
Questionable empiricism can be marshaled to support or refute any
proposition, but the diversity rationale is peculiarly vulnerable to this
danger. Other uses of data in the law typically emerge when both sides of
a dispute agree that facts gathered should inform outcomes. Diversity,
however, holds a fragile status even when it rests on solid numbers.
Judicial suspicion of discrimination, no matter how benign, will remain in
place even if diversity really does generate happy results. For this reason,
lawyers and activists opposed to affirmative action can oppose the
diversity rationale without having to challenge allegations about the
benefits of diversity. Because an affirmative action program can usually
be defeated without the refutation of happy empirical claims, its
adversaries—unlike adversaries in other fields who confront unwelcome

126. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Diversity as a Dead-End, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 705, 724–25 (2008).
127. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One
Dean’s Perspective, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1549, 1553 (2011) (“Few could, or do, seriously claim that student
diversity can somehow be viewed as an impediment to a high-quality legal education.”); Krotoszynski,
supra note 7, at 935–36 (“Does anyone think that learning in an all-white, all-male college or university
will ever be superior to learning in a comprehensively integrated environment?”).
128. Hansen, supra note 76, at 28; David A. Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A
New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, in Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 1–2.
129. Wildermuth & Gray, supra note 109, at 17.
130. Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads: Understanding the
Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 402, 402 (1996).
131. Id. at 421.
132. Thomas & Ely, supra note 128, at 4–5.
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data—can let these assertions stand with relative safety, not jeopardizing
their chances in court.
Happy empirical claims are politically convenient too. Consistent
133
with the prerogative-for-managers function of the diversity rationale,
elected officials and other decisionmakers subject to public scrutiny reap
advantages from claims about gain. These leaders can present their
decisions to favor diversity as driven by social science rather than
expediency. If diversity as an instrument functions well to attain
noncontroversial ends, then applauding it is more than just an easy
choice. Who among us prefers to be unprepared to navigate the global
economy, or wants the next generation to feel befuddled and threatened
by the unfamiliar? Because the term lacks definitional rigor, one can
purport to pursue it while doing very little.
The word hems nobody in and commits to nothing, while leaders
can call diversity valuable, even indispensable. Public figures who
embrace it gain shelter from political strife when the empirical claims
they make present diversity as a nonpartisan social engine, puttering
134
forward and doing good. Politicians of contrary stripes thus can agree
that diversity—undefined, unmeasured, unconstrained—makes a
population better off, even when they disagree about what to do in its
135
name and when to stop doing it. The next Subpart observes that for
speakers and listeners, positive rhetoric is more palatable than a protest
against injustice.
C. Papering over Subordination
Just as happy empirical claims connect the diversity rationale with
pleasant social conditions, a tactful silence about subordination and

133. See supra Part II.A.
134. See Jones, supra note 15, at 177 (“Everyone can feel good. No one need feel threatened or
excluded.”).
135. Stances on diversity from the last two U.S. presidents, politicians from opposing parties,
illustrate the phenomenon. Compare Bush Statement, supra note 21 (“University officials have the
responsibility and the obligation to make a serious effort to reach out to students from all walks of
life . . . . Schools should seek diversity by considering a broad range of factors in admissions, including
a student’s potential and life experiences.”), with Kathy Kiely, Making Their Case: Obama Relishes
Challenge of a “Difficult Time”, USA Today, Oct. 31, 2008, at 1A (quoting Senator Obama: “I come
from a diverse background and so I think I understand a lot of different cultures.”). Once in office, the
Obama administration continued to assert empirical claims. On diversity in education, see Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Education, New Guidance Supports Voluntary Efforts to Promote Diversity
and Reduce Racial Isolation in Education (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/newguidance-supports-voluntary-efforts-promote-diversity-and-reduce-racial-isol (quoting Attorney General
Eric Holder: “Diverse learning environments promote development of analytical skills, dismantle
stereotypes, and prepare students to succeed in an increasingly interconnected world.”); on diversity in
the workforce, see Exec. Order No. 13,583, 76 Fed. Reg. 52,847 (Aug. 18, 2011) (“[O]ur greatest
accomplishments are achieved when diverse perspectives are brought to bear to overcome our greatest
challenges.”).
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oppression keeps affirmative action measures optimistic rather than
aggrieved. Purporting to look forward rather than backward, diversity
“begins with an implicit denial of the defender’s participation in or
responsibility for past or contemporary racism,” objects critical race
136
scholar Charles Lawrence. “Minorities are hired or promoted not
because we have been unfairly treated, denied jobs, deprived of our
lands, or beaten and brought here in chains,” according to another leader
in this field, Richard Delgado. Enter affirmative action, buttressed by the
diversity rationale, which “neatly diverts our attention from all those
137
disagreeable details and calls for a fresh start.”
Diversity as a papering-over that obscures, and even denies,
138
subordination occupies a vast literature. After Grutter constitutionalized
diversity as a good reason for governmental discrimination—“a compelling
139
interest” —American legal scholarship about affirmative action has had
to grapple with the relation between antisubordination, a painful
rationale for what Justice Powell called “consideration” of categories like
140
“race and ethnic origin,” and diversity, the alternative motive that
141
treads lightly on “all those disagreeable details.” Presently I will have
more to say about diversity and antisubordination functioning as both
142
rivals and mutually constitutive efforts toward social progress. For now
I note the anodyne nature of the rationale. Diversity is blander than
antisubordination.
Diversity is blander not only because the wounds of enslavement
and government-sponsored segregation are still raw in the United States,
but because of the subordination inherent in layers of wealth and class.
“The problem with affirmative action is not (as is often said) that it
violates the principles of meritocracy,” writes Walter Benn Michaels,
describing diversity in American universities; “the problem is that it
143
produces the illusion that we actually have a meritocracy.” By their
presence, writes Michaels, African-American classmates tacitly testify
that white students are there “on merit because they didn’t get there at
144
the expense of any black people.” Soothed by a righteous message,

136. Lawrence, supra note 16, at 953.
137. Delgado, supra note 16, at 1223–24.
138. Bell, supra note 8, at 1632–33; Cho, supra note 19, at 1052; Delgado, supra note 16, at 1223;
Lawrence, supra note 16, at 953. See generally Alan Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The View from
1989, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 1407, 1425 (1990) (commenting on Bakke: “Thus, in the name of a diversity that
equates race with being a ‘farm boy from Idaho,’ admissions programs could continue to admit
students on the basis of race.” (citations omitted)).
139. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
140. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
141. Delgado, supra note 16, at 1224.
142. See infra Parts III & IV.
143. Michaels, supra note 15, at 85.
144. Id.

Bernstein_29 (A. Bernstein) (Do Not Delete)

226

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/19/2012 3:07 PM

[Vol. 64:101

beneficiaries of class privilege gain an excuse from having to think about
their wealth.
Diversity changes the subject. For Michaels, affirmative action
145
appeals to campus elites because it flatters them. More focused than
Michaels on racial subordination, Derrick Bell has agreed that diversity
in higher education admissions amounts to “a serious distraction” from
the persistence of severe economic disadvantage, a condition that keeps
146
deserving persons out of college.
In addition to changing the subject, diversity fosters blandness
because it helps to smother whatever conversation about American
distributions of wealth might otherwise arise. As Michaels notes acidly,
“the kind of diversity produced by a larger number of poor students isn’t
exactly the sort of thing a college can plausibly celebrate—no poor
people’s history month, no special theme dormitories (i.e., no Poor
House alongside Latino House and Asia House) and no special reunions
147
for poor alumni.” The call that anti-racist initiatives announce—“to
give up our prejudices”—may sound strenuous, but it coddles privileged
persons in comparison to an alternative call for economic equality.
Forestalled by diversity talk, such a demand “might require us to give up
148
our money.”

III. Diversity as Corrective and Distributive Justice
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever
has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty
149
be lost in the pursuit.

The origin of any justice-based claim for a group is a historical
150
wrong whose effects persist. In diction made famous by Aristotle, the
consequences that oppress the group are violations of both corrective and
151
distributive justice. A corrective justice claim asserts that individuals
who are members of harmed groups have suffered unrectified wrongs. A
distributive justice claim addresses allocation. Benefits and detriments, it
asserts, are held in a wrongful pattern: too much for some and too little
152
for others. Writings on reparations owed for the wrong of slavery

145. Id.
146. Bell, supra note 8, at 1622, 1632–33.
147. Michaels, supra note 15, at 89.
148. Id.
149. The Federalist No. 51, at 324 (James Madison).
150. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 855, 865–
67 (1995) (discussing corrective justice and distributive justice rationales for affirmative action in
higher education).
151. See generally Izhak Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to
Modern Times (2009) (examining Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics).
152. See Bron Raymond Taylor, Affirmative Action at Work: Law, Politics, and Ethics 40–42
(1991) (considering corrective-justice and distributive-justice rationales for affirmative action).
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explore the jurisprudence of this claim in a race-based context. Other
groups that continue to suffer from unrectified wrongs can hold
corrective and distributive justice claims as well.
Understood in terms of corrective and distributive justice, diversity
is more of an outcome than a goal. Because more than one axis of
oppression exists in the United States and multiple redresses can be
undertaken at the same time, rectification of subordination through
affirmative action will make any setting more diverse. Consider, for
example, efforts deployed to ameliorate the effects of race and sex
discrimination in a workplace. Although interventions might seek
antisubordination rather than diversity, reparative intervention
necessarily installs more variety of race and sex. Even if an intervention
addresses only one axis of subordination, such as race alone, it
154
necessarily diversifies the setting.
Affirmative action when implemented operates as a source of
redistribution, recognizing groups that, due to historical injustice, possess
155
either too much or too little. For this reason, distributive justice relates
more directly than corrective justice to the task of justifying diversity as
affirmative-action policy. Five precepts, or premises of distributionfocused affirmative action, help to direct and limit intervention.
Reviewing these precepts, I consider affirmative action as a source of
diversity in recurring settings.
One caution before we begin: Published generalizations about the
justice or injustice of affirmative action have struck readers as vague,
conclusory, poorly delineated to the point of meaninglessness, or detached
156
from reality. I acknowledge the peril and promise to engage it in the last
Part of this Article, which considers diversity as a fact on the ground.

153. See generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23; Kyle D. Logue, Reparations as Redistribution,
84 B.U. L. Rev. 1319 (2004) (exploring distributive justice claims); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing
the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 279 (2003)
(reviewing the debate).
154. See Levinson, supra note 69, at 586.
155. Robert Nozick, though doubtful that affirmative action might be justified, sketched a
rationale:
[A]ssuming (1) that victims of injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and
(2) that those from the least well-off group in the society have the highest probabilities of
being the (descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed compensation
by those who benefited from the injustices (assumed to be those better off, though
sometimes the perpetrators will be others in the worst-off group), then a rough rule of
thumb for rectifying injustices might seem to be the following: organize society so as to
maximize the position of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 231 (1974).
156. See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
68 U. Colo. L. Rev. 939 (1997) (analyzing flaws of the diversity rationale); Walter P. Jacob, Note,
Diversity Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel Politics, 6 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 297, 301 (1992)
(discussing the diversity rationale in immigration law).
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A. Five Distributive Precepts
Distributive justice makes reference to goods, drawbacks,
advantages, disadvantages, opportunities, and restrictions generally, not
157
just “resources” in the material sense. Because nouns in this literature
have become cluttered with glosses and secondary meanings that occlude
this discussion, I will refer to socially distributed conditions or things as
“items,” a less familiar term. To start with the most basic precept:
(1) Persons are entitled to hold their fair share of items. Holding too much
or too many bad items, or too few or too little good items, violates
distributive justice.
This generalization, seeking a basic starting point, makes no
reference to equality and does not pause over the contrast, made famous
158
by Robert Nozick, of opportunities with results. An individual might
hold extraordinarily low or high quantities of wealth, health, power, and
so on without necessarily manifesting any violation of distributive justice.
Her holding, even if very different from what other people have, could
have resulted from distributively just antecedents.
In pursuit of the first precept, positive law reallocates items consistent
with some distributive goal. For example, progressive taxation (in principle
at least) transfers wealth from the rich to the poor. Environmental
regulation burdens one group, industry, to benefit another group, the
public.
Law-based redistribution typically takes multiple values into
account. Transferring wealth from rich to poor, for example, might
159
comport with an equality-of-resources distributive justice ideal, but
160
other desiderata, both material and nonmaterial, limit this agenda.
Accordingly, legislation and judicial decisions that transfer wealth
proceed with caution. They do not transfer as much as could be
transferred; they limit the reach of government. Distributive justice thus
both motivates and limits the redistributions of positive law. Though
constrained, positive law undertakes these interventions. Second precept:
(2) Positive law does, and should, endeavor to achieve distributive justice.
The third precept recognizes social groups, or classes of persons
subject to regulation by the law, as central to distributive justice. Rather
than defend the precept, here I use it descriptively as an axiom of law in

157. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 283 (1983).
158. Nozick, supra note 155, at 161–66.
159. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 993,
1108 (2004).
160. Among them are procedural regularity, the need to consider incentives, and rights or
prerogatives that derive from lawful ownership. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral
Reading of the American Constitution 11 (1996) (identifying the Constitution as a source of
constraint).
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action. American law herds persons into classifications. These groupings
extend beyond the protected-class prescriptions and enforcements that it
states in its civil rights doctrine; they are pervasive.
Law would be unintelligible without legal statuses that give
privileges and detriments to persons based on categories and political
subdivisions that assign tasks to members of groups. The ideal of “a
government of laws, not of men” becomes coherent only with reference
to aggregation: The law strives to treat a person with reference to his
category. Mr. Firstname Lastname stands before the law not as a set of
one—his unique self—but as a member of some cohort. He must be
treated as part of some pertinent class, for example: taxpayers, plaintiffs,
appellees, respondents, voters, employers, felons, citizens, parents, or
residents of a particular state. Third precept: (3) The groups to which
individuals belong affect their distributive-justice entitlements to items.
These first three precepts take us to what distributive justice,
understood here as an impetus for state action, might wish to achieve. I
return to what Aristotle paired with distributive justice in the
Nicomachean Ethics: corrective justice, understood here as
161
rectification. Scholars have labored to distinguish corrective from
distributive justice. Cognizant of that distinction, I work where they
overlap: Claims rooted in corrective justice identify conditions as unjust
and seek intervention as repair. The fourth precept applies corrective
justice to redistribution as undertaken through state action: (4) Groupbased detriments contrary to distributive justice ought to be rectified by the
162
law correlatively, in the form of group-based advantage.
The last precept just noted recognizes the need for distributive
schemes to guard against claims that lack a foundation in justice.
Recognizing that law-based redistribution may encourage individuals to
jettison memberships that do not enrich them, if they can, and assume
advantageous ones, equal protection doctrine rightly includes mutability
as among the variables that pertain to whether a classification is
163
suspect. If individuals can drop or pick up membership in a group
161. See generally Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (2011).
162. See generally Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 34–35 (1995) (offering a liberal
defense of group rights). Numerous constraints, in both theory and practice, limit the force of this
fourth precept. For difficulties in theory, see supra note 160 and accompanying text; for difficulties in
practice, see infra Part V. Nevertheless, this precept underlies every affirmative action plan that
aspires to comport with justice. Those who oppose affirmative action categorically must either disclaim
any interest in justice, deny the history that affirmative action seeks to ameliorate, or deem an
affirmative-action cure worse than the disease of injustice. See supra note 20.
163. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 220 (1982) (holding that illegal immigrants do not
constitute a suspect class because they chose their status; their children, who made no such choice,
come closer to suspect-class status); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (including
immutability among the criteria for a suspect classification). For a critique of immutability in equal
protection doctrine, see Michael A. Helfand, The Usual Suspect Classifications: Criminals, Aliens, and
the Future of Same-Sex Marriage, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1 (2009).
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opportunistically, leaving or joining it at little cost, then this group
affiliation is relatively shallow; its holdings are unlikely to be a matter of
distributive justice.
This prospect yields a fifth precept: (5) Self-help being more consistent
with liberty than action by the state, and action by the state being costly, the
law ought to reserve its interventions for persons who cannot readily shed a
detrimental group membership or acquire a beneficial one, and it ought to
deploy its remedial powers with care.
Priorities for action under this fifth precept of scarcity will emerge
when decisionmakers face tradeoffs. Examples include heft (that is,
focusing on group-based detriments that impose onerous rather than
trivial burdens on members) and urgency (or, when aware of too many
instances of group-based disadvantages than they can readily try to fix at
once, decisionmakers ought to focus on what can achieve the most
necessary repairs).
B. Antisubordination as a Source of Diversity
As was noted, diversity and antisubordination overlap in outcome
rather than purpose. The two come together when claims made for
redistribution to benefit subordinated groups are successful. Here a
posited entitlement that meets criteria of the five precepts will justify
redress for the group in the form of positive discrimination. The
distributive-justice reason for affirmative action is to ameliorate unjust
underrepresentation in a favored group. Two questions then arise for
164
implementers: Which groups ought to be addressed by the scheme? And
which contexts are suited to justice-focused recognition of group
members?
1. Which Groups? Statutory civil rights law, which contains lists of
groups that hold claims based on their having been oppressed, at least in
165
166
the past, is the best place to start answering this question. Corrective
and distributive justice can modify these lists via both subtraction and
addition. Subtraction from an affirmative action distribution—that is,
rendering a group ineligible for beneficent intervention—becomes
warranted when a group listed as disadvantaged in a statute has
164. See Sean A. Pager, Antisubordination of Whom? What India’s Answer Tells Us About the
Meaning of Equality in Affirmative Action, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289, 291 (2007) (referring to the
“Who Question”).
165. Arguing that African Americans have a good claim for affirmative action, Kim Forde-Mazrui
gives an example of this analysis by first noting detriments experienced by this group and then
connecting those experiences to wrongful discrimination. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 23, at 695–98
(gathering data about current social welfare); id. at 698–707 (relating these detriments to unlawful
antecedents).
166. See Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex,
62 Fla. L. Rev. 895, 933–34 (2010) (arguing that a “statutory warrant” helps to legitimize the
imposition of detriments and benefits on groups).
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overcome the oppression that afflicted it or brings no justice-based
168
claim to the transfer proposed in the scheme. When these conditions
pertain, the affirmative action plan ought to exclude the group from
beneficial redistribution. As for proposed additions, their inclusion is
limited by the fifth distributive-justice precept: Because diversity as a
rationale for affirmative action can cause harm, it ought to be applied
169
sparingly.
Several groups present claims for redistribution in the form of
affirmative action. The preeminent civil rights classification, known by
the misleading yet familiar rubric “race,” makes reference to injustices
that vary depending on historical antecedents and their continuing
consequences: Slavery and de jure segregation oppressed African
Americans, for example, whereas Native peoples suffered genocide and
170
forced migration. Sex discrimination, another venerable civil rights
category, can justify interventions on behalf of not only women but also
sexual-orientation and sexual-presentation minorities frequently grouped
under acronym rubrics like LGBT. Disability law, our source for
171
“otherwise qualified,” identifies another classification.
To deserve favorable treatment that displaces someone else, any
individual who holds membership in an underrepresented group must be
172
qualified for a place there. If she is unqualified, then her exclusion is
not unjust and thus becomes ineligible for distributive-justice
rectification. This condition persists even if the group in which she holds
membership is underrepresented in the setting with reference to another
denominator, such as its proportion in the population at large.
2. Which Contexts? Antisubordination as an imperative could
plausibly justify extraordinarily ambitious schemes of redistribution, but
diversity as our unit of analysis blunts its radical potential. Consider, for
example, the premise that title to land in much of the world—in the
Western hemisphere in particular—lacks legitimacy because it rests on
lawless seizure from, and dispossession of, indigenous peoples. From this
relatively uncontroversial starting point one might take bold steps. State

167. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (expressing hope that the affirmative action
measure approved by the Court might no longer be necessary in twenty-five years).
168. See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 943,
987 (2002) (calling the inclusion of Alaska Natives in a Richmond, Virginia affirmative action plan
“reflexive or thoughtless”).
169. See supra note 128.
170. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(contending that historical wrongs support affirmative action to benefit “African Americans,
Hispanics and Native Americans”).
171. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2007).
172. For a thoughtful assessment of how concepts of desert pervade affirmative action, see Ruth
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights
Dialogue, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 253 (1999).
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actors could declare land title null and void, force individuals to vacate
the places they think they have rights to control and enjoy, and tear
down buildings, industrial sites, and artifices like dams and mines. But
because a seizing-and-dispossessing plan does not include diversity as we
understand the term—we are considering a social concept concerned
173
with the relative status or groups and individuals —it lies outside the
bounds of this discussion. Settings for diversity are necessarily shared
and they encompass more than property holdings. To qualify as a
diversity setting, a locus must permit members of different groups to
174
coexist at least near one another and often together.
Social coexistence, the center of diversity, meets corrective and
distributive justice, the basis for affirmative action aimed at redressing
subordination, in three overlapping yet distinct ways. First, a
subordinated group might have in the past been excluded unjustly from
the opportunity to join decisionmaking bodies. Here, affirmative action
would make seats at the table of authority available to members of the
group. Electoral redistricting installed to increase minority
representation in a diverse legislature provides an example of this
175
Corporate board
conjunction of antisubordination with diversity.
176
diversity measures also illustrate this category. Gender quotas installed
to foster women’s political participation offer a third example. In the
United States and numerous other countries, certain political bodies—
legislatures, political conventions, state political committees—must,
according to positive law or party rules, contain a stated minimum
177
percentage of women. Of all the overlaps between diversity and

173. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
174. Because of this concern with coexistence I exclude from this diversity-meetsantisubordination framework those instances of affirmative action that focus on distribution of spoils.
Supreme Court decisions offer illustrations. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448
(1980). Although the affirmative action programs evaluated in these decisions may be justifiable on
other grounds, their connection to diversity is too attenuated for that rationale to hold.
175. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
176. Kimberly Krawiec has led this discussion. See Lissa L. Broome, John M. Conley & Kimberly
D. Krawiec, Dangerous Categories: Narratives of Corporate Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 759, 770–
71 (2011); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model,
32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 571, 593–95 (2005); Kimberly Krawiec, Critical Mass and the Decline of AfricanAmerican Men on Public Company Boards, Faculty Lounge (May 8, 2011),
http://www.thefacultylounge.org/2011/05/
critical-mass-and-the-decline-of-african-american-men-on-public-company-boards.html.
177. N.Y. Elec. L. § 2-110.2 (approving of gender quotas for party leaders of state assembly
districts, available if political parties so choose); Lisa Schnall, Note, Party Parity: A Defense of the
Democratic Party Equal Division Rule, 13 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 381, 382–84 (2005)
(describing quotas for women in national legislatures around the world and the Democratic Party
national convention).
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affirmative action, seats-at-the-table is the most pointed because it
178
adverts most bluntly to wealth and power.
A second overlap between social coexistence on one hand and
corrective and distributive justice on the other emphasizes the
progressive effects of individuals’ contact with diverse cohorts. Like the
179
“happy empirical claims” explored above, this argument for affirmative
action posits that diversity generates benefits, but whereas happy
empirical claims about diversity tend to avoid politics and controversy,
this contention puts antisubordination up front. Its premise is that, other
things being equal, a member of a subordinated group is better off in a
group that contains members of the non-subordinated cohort: to learn
their (dominant) folkways, become familiar and thus less threatening to
the ascendant group, gain opportunities to exchange gifts and do favors,
and so on. Members of the non-subordinated cohort in this perspective
also gain from diversity: They learn, teach, and exchange. Writers have
noted that gains to dominant groups occupy Grutter: Justice O’Connor
celebrated racial diversity as useful to the (white) persons who fill and
180
lead elite universities, big business, and national security. In principle,
however, members of subordinated groups also gain from diversity. This
category of interchange and exchange describes two major settings where
the diversity rationale thrives: education and employment.
A third overlap between justice and diversity relates to the public
status of subordinated groups. Here we may return to the concern for
speech and expression that impelled Justice Powell to embrace the
modern diversity rationale in Bakke. Powell, as was noted, pointedly
never linked diversity and antisubordination, but his reasoning functions
to rectify an injustice: Environments that lack diversity prop up rigid,
oppressive, reductive misperceptions of subordinated groups. Whenever
groups of persons are excluded from—or are grossly underrepresented
in—a setting, their members’ voices are less heard. Diversity mixes these
persons with dominant cohorts, expressing a progressive message that
can effectively rebut misinformation.
The setting of broadcast licenses illustrates this overlap. Decades
after the Supreme Court upheld an affirmative action scheme to promote
diversity in broadcasting, researchers continue to state that women and

178. This political force emerges in the caution that is manifested whenever advocates press for
seats-at-the-table diversity. Corporate board initiatives as practiced in the United States eschew quotas
but speak relatively explicitly about subordination; political participation minimums for women, at
least in the United States, make no reference to subordination but embrace a quota; race-conscious
electoral districts become enacted with neither quotas nor overt statements about subordination.
Quotas buttressed by a protest about subordination do not—and apparently cannot—exist in
American affirmative action. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003); Garda, supra note 72, at 607–08; Nunn, supra
note 126, at 724.
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racial minorities are underrepresented among license holders.
Observers decry the depiction of both racial minorities and women in
182
media as deficient. These reports suggest a relation between low
ownership of this communication technology and poor treatment in the
content it disseminates. Put more positively, a transfer of broadcast
licenses in favor of racial minorities and women can enhance justice in
how these groups appear in public media.
These settings that fill affirmative action debates—education, the
workplace, corporate boards, broadcast licensing—present multiple
instances of where justice and diversity intersect. For example, although I
have offered diversity in university admissions as an example of the
second type of overlap—gains made from bringing together dominant
and subordinated groups to coexist and learn from one another—
diversity in university admissions also illustrates the other two types of
overlap: Reallocating places in a selective educational institution changes
who sits at the decisionmaking table, the first overlap, and also influences
the expressions and representations present in the third.
Constrained by the third distributive precept that encourages
parsimony, viewpoint diversity offers a good example of this third
possibility. Enlarging the range or quantity of opinions and perspectives
might enhance distributive justice. It need not do so, however.
Proponents of extending the diversity rationale to variety in viewpoints
must demonstrate the gains to distributive justice in what they prescribe.
Corporate boards might be a place where this kind of diversity would
183
increase distributive justice. In other contexts, a person’s viewpoint
might be too vaguely defined—or too mutable or open to opportunistic
184
embrace or abandonment —to withstand an inquiry into its effect on

181. Eric Klinenberg, Fighting for Air: The Battle to Control America’s Media 28 (2007)
(reporting 2005 statistics about low ownership rates for both minorities and women); Caridad Austin,
Note, Overwhelmed by Big Consolidation: Bringing Back Regulation to Increase Diversity in
Programming That Serves Minority Audiences, 63 Fed. Comm. L.J. 733, 734 (2011).
182. Martha M. Lauzen et al., Constructing Gender Stereotypes Through Social Roles in Prime-Time
Television, 52 J. Broad. & Elec. Media, June 2008, at 200; Greg Braxton, Networks Still Struggling with
Diversity, Study Says; Television Children’s Advocacy Group Sees Areas for Improvement amid Some
Positive Developments, L.A. Times, July 18, 2000, at Part F.
183. One scholar identifies an end similar to distributive justice—“a law and social equity
rationale”—that supports increasing the “worldview diversity” of board members. Regina F. Burch,
Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity Rationale, 42 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 585,
597 (2011). According to this rationale, the ascendant worldview inside American boardrooms has
been too fond of risk, with deleterious effects on the national economy; more worldview diversity
would bring in prudence. Id. at 615–20; see Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective
Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 465, 465
(2007) (reporting on “the white male effect,” which posits that “white men fear various risks less than
women and minorities”).
184. On immutability, see supra note 163. Equal protection doctrine recognizes that a
characteristic need not be immutable to gain recognition as “suspect.” See, e.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army,
875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (acknowledging uncertainty about the mutability of homosexual
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distributive justice. Religious diversity presents another example.
Scholars who advocate for it have not yet formed a justice-based
185
Members of religious groups might have a claim in
argument.
distributive justice for affirmative action, but proponents of this shift in
resources need to say why.

IV. Justifying Diversity with Its Analogues
Advocates for diversity remain coy, or perhaps undecided, about the
fundamentals they value. They eschew commitments on such basics as
the type of variety they pursue and how much variation within a
186
regulated population will suffice to effect the rationale. We have noted
the appeal of this flexibility and indeterminacy to institutional
187
Though useful on the ground, flexibility and
decisionmakers.
indeterminacy comes at the expense of principle. Attention to contrary
virtues—including candor, clarity, and fidelity to ideals—can make
diversity principled rather than merely expedient. This Part surveys
ideals that diversity advances.
In saying that “diversity advances” various ideals, I do not add to
188
what the last Part called happy empirical claims. Diversity as policy can
certainly fail; it can also cause harm. Rather than make promises, then, this
Part considers alignments of principle between diversity and other values
189
esteemed in American civic life. They include pluralism, separation of

orientation). Courts, however, expect membership in a claimant’s group to be relatively durable and
hard to exit. See generally Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1483, 1489 (2011) (proposing that federal courts interpret
statutory employment law to prohibit discrimination on the basis of an immutable characteristic,
defined as “(1) a characteristic that is an accident of birth, or (2) a characteristic that is unchangeable
or so fundamental to personal identity that workers effectively cannot and should not be required to
change it for employment purposes”).
185. Cf. Levinson, supra note 69, at 601 (arguing that the best justification for affirmative action is
a claim of historical mistreatment).
186. Chen, supra note 17; Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity,
4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 881, 883 (1996) (“If Bakke was meant to promote diversity of culture per
se, then it rapidly becomes unmanageable, as scores or hundreds of cultures justly claim equal
representation under affirmative action plans . . . .”).
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. Thus although this Part shares common ground with David Orentlicher, Diversity: A
Fundamental American Principle, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 777 (2005), it draws a narrower conclusion. Professor
Orentlicher praises diversity, relating it to analogues that I will consider presently—including
federalism, separation of powers, and markets—and concludes that diversity “plays a fundamental role
in the American structure of government and ideal of a free enterprise economic system because it
both promotes good outcomes and prevents socially harmful behavior.” Id. at 812. As noted, I worry
about happy empirical claims; the “good outcomes” that diversity “promotes” are far from certain. See
supra Part II.B. Moreover, in my view distributive justice, a topic absent from Orentlicher’s article, is
needed to justify diversity regardless of whether one rejects the antisubordination thesis stated in this
Part.
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powers, and other sources of decentralization. This discussion also
considers doctrines in American law that give effect to these values.
A. Pluralism
Diversity can enhance social and political life by augmenting variety
where variety is desirable. The term pluralism refers to this pursuit.
Literatures in philosophy, juxtaposing pluralistic moral theories against
190
monistic ones, acknowledge the strengths of both. Monism offers
commensurability and cohesion; it supplies a yardstick by which
competing alternatives can be measured. Ancient thought, as recorded in
the Old and New Testaments as well as writings of the Greeks and their
Roman successors, celebrated monism: It had no use for diversity of
191
peoples, beliefs, or values. The baleful Tower of Babel states an
192
enduring ancient conception of pluralism as destructive. Throughout
history, pluralism as a source of social good has had far fewer adherents
193
than monism.
Yet even antiquity records philosophical support for pluralism as a
source of wisdom. When Aristotle—hardly a champion of minorities—
194
asked rhetorically whether “all slavery [is] a violation of nature,” his
answer was a resounding “no.” “[F]rom the hour of their birth, some are
195
marked out for subjection, others for rule.” And yet decisions and
deliberations gain strength from multiple participants, Aristotle wrote,
“just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner provided
196
out of a single purse.”
Contemporary arguments that defend pluralism encourage attention
to “those differences in values, attributes, or activities among individuals
or groups that a particular society deems salient,” which is how Peter
197
Schuck defined diversity. With this understanding as background, I
make four claims for pluralism. All pertain to contemporary applications
of diversity.
1. Variation as expansion. “The common thread is the idea that
morality should not be stifling in various possible ways,” writes

190. See generally Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Kantian Pluralism, 102 Ethics 743, 743–45 (1992) (contrasting
pluralistic and monistic theories).
191. Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and Now, 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1915,
1917–19 (2001).
192. Id. at 1917.
193. See generally Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Fear of Diversity: The Birth of Political Science in
Ancient Greek Thought (1992) (exploring political traditions that emphasize unity and harmony).
194. Aristotle’s Politics 58 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1943).
195. Id.
196. Id. at Book III, Part xi 60; see also Saxonhouse, supra note 193, at 212–14 (noting that on this
point Aristotle diverged from his teacher and mentor, Plato).
197. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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198

philosopher Thomas E. Hill, Jr. “Pluralist theories, it may be supposed,
affirm a less stifling morality insofar as they oppose unnecessary
restrictions on liberty, dogmatic assertions of moral truth, and moralistic
judgments about other cultures and the life-styles chosen by other
199
individuals.” Whether diversity among groups of persons generates or
encourages diversity as resistance to “stifling morality” is of course an
unresolved question. Hill’s reference to “moralistic judgments about
200
other cultures,” however, suggests an affirmative answer. Interaction
causes diverse cohorts of persons to observe one another. Revelations of
themselves mixed with exposure to other groups gives them context to
understand the relations between the antecedents and behaviors of
unfamiliar sectors.
2. Insights into the veil of ignorance. Here I refer to the famous
construct of John Rawls that, building on work by the economist John C.
Harsanyi, asks which opinions and preferences about social welfare
individuals would reach when they do not know what their position in
201
their society would be. Rawls applied to this inquiry “the difference
202
principle,” which, he argued, leads these individuals to support welfarestate interventions. Because they could be destitute and powerless, they
would choose to guard against misery by accepting constraints and taxes
that burden the fortunate cohort.
Diversity as an ambient condition enhances the answers that
respondents would give to the hypothetical question. Rawls had invited
his readers to ponder deep steppes of ignorance: The human being he
posited does not know “his place in society, his class position or social
status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets
203
and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like.” Behind their
veil of ignorance, individuals living in conditions of diversity still do not
know their own place and their own fortune in the state-to-be. Exposure
to different groups of persons educates them about the stakes in their
answer, however; proximity to varied groups gives the Rawlsian
respondent insight into characteristics that bear on distributive
204
outcomes. Diversity as an ambient condition might also make these

198. Hill, supra note 190, at 749.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136 (1971); John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare
Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking, 61 J. Pol. Econ. 434, 435 (1953) (broaching the question
of “what sort of society one would prefer if one had an equal chance of being ‘put in the place of’ any
particular member of the society”).
202. Rawls, supra note 201, at 75–83.
203. Id. at 137.
204. Elsewhere I have noted that attention to diversity also opens the questions of whether the
veil-of-ignorance premise is coherent and how it pertains to existing sources of identity:
Affiliative homo sapiens cannot survive without personal relationships, but group identities
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respondents’ answers less predictable than what Rawls had presumed.
The veil of ignorance is more than a metaphor for academics. It explains
206
origins and bases of some policies in place. Diversity gives it more
substance.
3. Peace. Regardless of whether policymakers prescribe, proscribe,
or ignore diversity, they live and function in a world filled with human
variety. A power holder resisting diversity even by the most egregious
means (such as de jure segregation, ethnic cleansing, and genocide) will
fail to undo this variegation, and less egregious forms of resistance will
have less effect. In this sense, what I have in the previous paragraph
called “diversity as an ambient condition” always exists; although I have
commended it as a choice, it cannot be avoided. And once diversity is
understood as a fixture, it becomes more desirable as a choice, because
the installed type of diversity prepares an individual to live better in a
world that contains diversity as a fixture.
The philosopher Henry Hardy, writing about moral pluralism, puts
the point this way: A person “in the grip of a monist view of morality and
politics” will think of his own commitments as universal, never
207
idiosyncratic. People who differ will appear
mistaken or flawed rather than as having an equally valid take on life,
and this in turn will tend to generate conflict, resentment, suspicion,
rejection rather than tolerance, accommodation, receptivity,
compromise. But if I am a pluralist I will accept or welcome different
208
moral conceptions rather than feeling threatened by them.

Let me acknowledge promptly that variety in human demographics is
different from variety in moral stances. Not every claim for moral
pluralism can be applied to diversity as a social intervention. Hardy is
correct to say, however, that “tolerance, accommodation, receptivity,
[and] compromise” fit better with pluralism than monism. Diversity,

press harder on the consciousness of subordinated people—such that, as a general rule,
white Americans give relatively little thought to their race, American Protestants tend to
view their religious identity in spiritual terms rather than as an immutable marker of who
they are, and heterosexual men are not much preoccupied with gender and sexual
orientation. Every human being is endowed with particularistic traits, but some groups
experience their particulars more consciously and intensely than others . . . .
Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 445, 468–69 (1997).
205. When Harsanyi asked the same veil-of-ignorance question in 1953, he reached a different
answer from the welfare-state response that Rawls had chosen. Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the
Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1315,
1326–28 (2004) (noting that Harsanyi reached his answer by applying utilitarian analysis; he envisioned
himself as an average member of the hypothetical society, rather than someone at its ebb).
206. See id. at 1327 n.67.
207. Henry Hardy, Isaiah Berlin’s Key Idea, The Isaiah Berlin Virtual Library, http://berlin.
wolf.ox.ac.uk/writings_on_ib/hhonib/isaiah_berlin%27s_key_idea.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
208. Id.
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which instantiates pluralism in a social setting, tells individuals that they
have to get along.
4. Moral seriousness. Similar to how diversity has been misunderstood
209
and misused as a vaguer and cheerier substitute for affirmative action,
210
pluralism has been misconstrued: Detractors equate it with relativism.
One noted defense of pluralism against the charge of relativism lends
value to the task of making diversity principled. In his last essay, Isaiah
Berlin distinguished pluralism from relativism on the ground that “the
multiple values [present in pluralism] are objective, part of the essence of
211
humanity rather than arbitrary creations of men’s subjective fancies.”
A reader can quibble with the diction—“objective” and “the essence of
humanity” have grown fraught since Berlin’s day—but the core stays in
place: Not every purported value or preference will deserve recognition
212
within pluralism. And not every form of variation warrants recognition
in a diversity scheme. I shall say more on the point below. For now, the
distinction between pluralism, a profound value, and relativism, a
shallow one, offers precedent for understanding diversity as principled
rather than (or in addition to) anodyne.
B. Separation of Powers: Rereading FEDERALIST NO. 51
One instance of diversity that enjoys deep public approval is
213
separation of powers. The national government in the United States
takes a tripartite form—executive, legislative, and judicial—in which the
sphere of action for each sector is written into the Constitution and also
214
fills considerable decisional law. Pluralism within units of government,
in this view, generates more strength than would exist in a governmental
monolith. Federalist No. 51, a foundational document for the United
States, defends checks and balances as ultimately more generative of
stability than an undivided government, even though the experience of
being checked and balanced by two rivals is costly for any sector in the
215
scheme.
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 329, 336 (2007) (gathering sources).
211. Isaiah Berlin, Isaiah Berlin on Pluralism, University of Texas, http://www.cs.utexas.edu/
users/vl/notes/berlin.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
212. By way of example from Berlin: “I like my coffee with milk and you like it without; I am in
favor of kindness and you prefer concentration camps.” Id.
213. “It is safe to say that a respect for the principle of separation of powers is deeply ingrained in
every American.” See Teaching with Documents: Constitutional Issues: Separation of Powers, National
Archives, http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/separation-powers (last visited Oct. 2, 2012); see also
Separation of Powers—An Overview, National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/
legislatures-elections/legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
214. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev.
1939, 1943–44 (2011).
215. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 149, at 320–25.
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Returning to Federalist No. 51 is instructive for readers who seek
precedents for diversity as a rationale for actions that reallocate, because
its embrace of variety and divergence among power holders goes well
beyond the checks-and-balances threesome familiar from American
civics. Its author, identified as James Madison, starts with the individual
216
unit in the scheme: “[E]ach department should have a will of its own.”
Acknowledging that diversity is a source of resentment and pain,
Madison recognizes that having a will of one’s own necessarily creates
217
agendas, and he argues for giving each unit the power to resist what it
perceives as encroachments. His famed sentence, “Ambition must be
218
made to counteract ambition,” is an antithesis of the anodyne diversity
surveyed earlier in this Article. Diversity hurts, as Madison knew. It
219
inflicts detriment.
In addition to recognizing pain, Federalist No. 51 counts many more
stakeholders than the three-branches scheme might first appear to
include. Diversity flourishes throughout the plan of government
presented: Madison finds strength in the diversity of federalism, whereby
states and the national government regulate and respond to the
population, internal diversity originating inside the branches of
government (for example, the divergent districts that send
representatives to Congress), and diversity in society itself, which brings
220
variety to inputs and pressures that influence all the branches.
Continuing this breadth, separation of powers has an informal
meaning extending beyond units of government. Individuals participate
in social settings qua individuals, but also as members of subgroups.
Memberships are ascribed to them, and they in turn ascribe memberships
to other individuals—even when they sincerely abjure prejudice,
stereotyping, and social hierarchy. When individuals form cohorts, it
becomes possible to consider the relative power of each group,
trajectories of power in the immediate future, the formation of coalitions,
and other identity-forming political conditions. Increasing diversity can
increase the types of powers that are amenable to separation, both in the
aggregate and for particular cohorts.

216. Id. at 321.
217. Agendas extend beyond what the department can do by itself; for example, the department
might want another branch of government to take action. See generally Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A.
Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 Yale L.J. 350 (2011)
(praising separation of powers for impelling units and branches of government to challenge one
another and thereby overcoming passivity).
218. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 149, at 322.
219. See generally supra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
220. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 149, at 324.
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C. Diversity as Instrumental to Wealth and Safety
In refraining from making a claim that diversity delivers positive
221
consequences, this Article has hewn to a belief that any generalization
about increasing wealth and safety through diversity must be stated
narrowly and with care. Diverging from Part III, which used diversity to
argue for intervention aimed at rectification and distributive justice, this
Part confines itself to description and eschews recommendations.
Although I refrain from endorsing the contention that diversity
delivers wealth and safety, the writings that make this claim help to
justify diversity. Because they embrace an agenda more conservative
than the left-of-center pursuit related in the last Part, they expand a
circle of supporters. At this level diversity transcends ideology; it belongs
to no faction.
1. Wealth. Building on work by the economist and philosopher
Friedrich Hayek that praised the common law—in contrast to the civil
222
law—as a nurturant of markets and economic vitality, legal scholars
have argued that the common law is an engine of prosperity that will,
ceteris paribus, generate more prosperity in a nation-state than the civil
223
law. For Hayek, civil law is relatively inclined to fetter individual
choice, whereas the judges who made the common law in England,
fearing incursion by the Stuart monarchs, stood up staunchly for
224
property and contract rights and thus laid a foundation for capitalism.
Whether or not Hayek read English history accurately has been
225
debated, but this criticism does not challenge his linkages among
markets, libertarian political theory, the United States as a common law
jurisdiction, and diversity.
Diversity relates more directly to wealth in modern portfolio theory,
which in its most basic application encourages investors to choose
226
multiple types of holdings. Like other analogues to the diversity

221. See supra note 122, 188–189 and accompanying text.
222. Friedrich A. Hayek, 1 Law, Legislation, and Liberty: Rules and Order 81 (1973).
223. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right,
30 J. Legal Stud. 503, 523 (2001) (concluding that common law countries experienced faster economic
growth than civil law countries during 1960–1992); id. at 503–04 (reporting on other research that
found stronger investor protections in common law legal systems than their civilian counterparts);
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy—
Implications for Policy, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 831, 832 (2009) (summarizing, without endorsing, this
literature).
224. Mahoney, supra note 223, at 504–05.
225. Compare Ronald Hamowy, F.A. Hayek and the Common Law, 23 Cato J. 241, 262 (2003)
(concluding that Hayek overstated the power of the common law), with Mahoney, supra note 223, at
504 (concluding that Hayek’s views “are correct as a matter of legal history”).
226. The classic articulation of this idea is Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. Fin. 77, 89
(1952). For a contemporary expression, see Diversify Your Portfolio, Fidelity https://www.fidelity.com/
fixed-income-bonds/build-your-portfolio/diversify-your-portfolio (last visited Oct. 2, 2012) (“This
straightforward strategy has many complex iterations, but at its root it’s simply about spreading your
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rationale surveyed in this Part, as ideology the diversified portfolio
227
Legal doctrine reflects and buttresses this
enjoys wide support.
enthusiasm: Although American law has no authority to tell individuals
where to invest their money, it requires fiduciaries to pursue diversity in
228
the portfolios they control.
2. Safety. Modern portfolio theory tells investors to diversify their
portfolios not so much to reap earnings as to minimize volatility and
229
risk. Diversity in a portfolio narrows the range of what wealth-related
consequences can occur. By diluting commitments and scattering
attention, it allows for the hedging of bets. Diversity as an investment
strategy lives with the possibility of error, just as Federalist No. 51
accepted the risk that wise or benevolent branches of government would
be checked and balanced by foolish or corrupt rival units.
Diversity understood as prudence or bets-hedging emerges in
contemporary legal scholarship; “adaptive federalism” in the work of
230
David Adelman and Kirsten Engel offers a useful instance. Adelman
and Engel disagree with the claim that each type of environmental harm
has its own optimal jurisdiction—for example, that “regulation of
intrastate groundwater ought to be regulated by state and local
governments, whereas climate change should be addressed at the
231
international level” —by noting that the search for a unitary regulator
“washes out the diversity of local environmental, political, and economic
conditions that produce unique sets of selective pressures for
232
environmental regulation.” To Adelman and Engel, the interplay of
state and federal environmental regulation resembles a diversified

portfolio across several asset classes and sectors . . . .”).
227. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided
Notion?, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 287, 314 (1994) (describing the diversified portfolio as favored by
“currently popular financial theory”).
228. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2007) (providing that an ERISA “fiduciary shall
discharge his duties . . . by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large
losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so”); Uniform Prudent Investor
Act § 2 (1994) (applying modern portfolio theory); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of
Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 653 (2004) (noting the consensus among judges that trustees’ duty
of care obliges them to pursue diversified portfolios).
229. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 281 n.148 (1983); Diversify Your Portfolio, supra
note 226 (observing that diversification “can reduce the risk and volatility in your portfolio, ideally
allowing you to achieve returns with less stomach-churning ups and downs along the way”).
230. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in Preemption
Choice: The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question 277–99 (William W. Buzbee
ed., 2009) [hereinafter Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism]; David E. Adelman &
Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory
Authority, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1796, 1796–1800 (2008) [hereinafter Adelman & Engel, Adaptive
Federalism].
231. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 230, at 1798 (citation omitted).
232. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, supra note 230, at 294.
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portfolio. Just as diversification in holdings offers safety to investors and
sets up stronger prospects for wealth, diversification in power to regulate
risks to the environment can generate better rules than either of the
233
sovereigns could have written on its own.
Like popularizers of modern portfolio theory, Adelman and Engel
focus on risks and threats. Their illustrations of how redundancy has
succeeded focus on dangers to the environment that one jurisdiction
234
overlooked or ignored and another pounced on. Similarly, William
Buzbee celebrates local initiatives that filled the void of federal neglect
in regulating contaminated industrial wastelands (“brownfield sites”) in
235
urban areas. Diversity in the sources of environmental regulation is,
among other things, more regulation. Because regulation, in the authors’
view, enhances safety, the diversity they embrace has the desirable effect
of inhibiting dangerous conduct.
In this context, consider the larger genre in which “adaptive
federalism” finds its home. Robert Ahdieh, describing what he labels
236
“the new federalism,” gathers more than a dozen specimens of the
phenomenon as expounded by contemporary legal scholars. The
collection presents a variety of overlaps in governance:
Paul Berman’s studies of “cosmopolitan pluralism”; Benedict
Kingsbury’s and Richard Stewart’s explorations of global administrative
law; George Bermann’s analysis of transatlantic regulatory cooperation;
the study of transnational networks by Anne-Marie Slaughter and
others; studies of the European Union, including especially work on the
judiciary, on “comitology,” and on framework statutes, the open method
of coordination, and related paradigms of “soft law”; related to the
latter, explorations by Chuck Sabel and others of democratic
experimentalism; the varied new governance literature; studies of crossjurisdictional “engagement”; Greg Shaffer’s research on “transnational
transformations of the state”; work on the interaction of international
and national tribunals; strands of the latter literature focused on judicial
citation of international and foreign authority and on broader questions
of legitimacy; the discourse of global constitutionalism; Harold Koh’s
studies of transnational legal process; Hari Osofsky’s analysis of
multiscalar governance; and a growing literature on increasingly complex
dynamics of federalism within the United States, in constitutional law,
237
corporate law, environmental law, and other areas.

Ahdieh initially groups these classifications under the rubric of “realities
238
and conceptions of jurisdiction.” Quickly, however, he notes the

233. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Federalism, supra note 230, at 1820.
234. Id.
235. Adelman & Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, supra note 230, at 283 (citing William
W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 108, 122–26 (2005)).
236. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic Governance: The Changing
Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 Emory L.J. 1 (2007).
237. Id. at 2–3 (citations omitted).
238. Id. at 1.
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inadequacy of that narrow term: The stakes in the fields surveyed include
239
“community definition, sovereignty, and legitimacy.”
They also present diversity as safety. Multiple sources of regulation
mean more regulation, and from there generate more control. Units
recognized as institutions within the law—states (under formal
federalism), nation-states (in transnational governance), corporations,
legislatures, judicial systems—all hold power within “intersystemic
240
governance.” To be sure, diversity in its simplest horizontal form can
loosen controls. For example, jurisdictions can compete to become the
least demanding place to do business, as “race to the bottom” literatures
241
attest. Critics associate globalization with freeing businesses to pay
242
lower wages and elude environmental regulations.
Yet as new-federalist writings have shown, the number and force of
controls on persons and entities is greater than can be counted in formal
delineations of regulatory authority. Intersystemic governance means
more governance. If more regulation equals more safety, then diversity
becomes a source of safety as well as wealth.
D. Diversity in American Law
1. Fostering Markets. Whole fields of American law enforce the
proposition that market competition is desirable and warrants
encouragement. Preeminent among these fields is antitrust, which
proscribes actions by firms in restraint of competition, but others also
share the premise: securities law, which demands disclosures that inform
the decision to buy stock on a public exchange; consumer law, which
posits that buyers of goods and services are entitled to merchantability,
truth in packaging and marketing, and the rendering of information; and
commercial law, regulated by a comprehensive model statute that set out
to mirror and encourage the conditions of healthy markets. The “fresh
start” that bankruptcy promises debtors, the recording of real estate
holdings (along with their sale prices and other dollar amounts) and
security interests in collateral, the enforcement of contracts, the widening
types of intellectual property that may be owned and conveyed, the large
menu of alternative dispute resolution opportunities available to
239. Id. (quoting Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311,
319 (2002)).
240. The term is Ahdieh’s. See id.
241. Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the Bottom: Host
Governments, Home Governments and Multinational Companies, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 153 (2005); Richard
L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992).
242. Charles Derber, People Before Profit: The New Globalization in an Era of Terror, Big
Money, and Economic Crisis 148–51 (2002) (advocating a “global New Deal” in response); Adam
Warden, A Brief History of the Anti-Globalization Movement, 12 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 237,
241–242 (2004) (criticizing the World Trade Organization for indifference to this problem).
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businesses, among many other conditions, express enthusiasm for
transactions and exchanges.
Markets and diversity are mutually constitutive. Divergent tastes
and valuations make transactions possible. The seller of a used car, for
example, would rather have the cash value of that commodity than the
commodity itself; the buyer prefers the car to the cash; and the deal will
close—leaving both seller and buyer better off and increasing wealth—
because preferences are different rather than the same. Bigger
commercial venues, such as stock exchanges, cause diverse preferences to
emerge, influence prices, and be influenced in response. Thus diversity
243
fosters markets. Markets, in turn, foster diversity.
2. Flora and Fauna: Diversity in Environmental Law. Both domestic
and international environmental legal instruments strive to protect
diversity. In domestic law, the Endangered Species Act endorses and
244
fosters variety among species of animals and plants. Many states add
245
their own endangered species statutes. The Convention on Biological
Diversity, a treaty opened by the United Nations in 1992, brings diversity
246
to international environmental law and has 168 signatory nation-states.
Signed, though not ratified, by the United States, the Convention
associates environmental diversity with shelter, food, water, the cleanup
of wastes, protection against climatic extremes, and sustainability
247
generally. Implicitly this treaty posits that losses of genetic variation,
extinction of animal and plant species, and declines in the variety of
environments—mangroves, coral reefs, rain forest—threaten human life
even when the value of any particular loss cannot be quantified or linked
directly to a hazard.
Like diversity as an affirmative action rationale, diversity in
environmentalism could be misperceived as a rhetorical rather than
substantive development. Activists started to talk about biodiversity, one
might suppose, because established nouns like “pollution” or

243. Being aware of the array of goods on offer, in other words, opens individuals to newer
possibilities and encourages them to prefer variety over homogeneity. Markets and market-thinking
also support diversity as a rationale for affirmative action. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (associating racial and ethnic diversity in the classroom with a more robust
marketplace of ideas); supra notes 72–79 and accompanying text (observing that corporation managers
endorse workplace diversity as tending to improve sales and commercial relations).
244. The statute is understood to have this goal. See Anna T. Moritz et al., Biodiversity Baking and
Boiling: Endangered Species Act Turning down the Heat, 44 Tulsa L. Rev. 205, 234–35 (2008); John
Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 203, 204 (2009).
245. Robert B. McKinstry Jr. et al., Legal Tools That Provide Direct Protection for Elements of
Biodiversity, 16 Widener L.J. 909, 914 (2007) (lamenting that the authors’ home state, Pennsylvania, is
not among them).
246. List of Parties, Convention on Biological Diversity, http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/
list (last visited Oct. 2, 2012).
247. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Sustaining Life on Earth: How
the Convention on Biological Diversity Promotes Nature and Human Well-Being (2000).
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“conservation” had grown dull, or perhaps to leverage the faddish
popularity of diversity in other contexts like education or the workplace.
Even if this genesis of the term is accurate, however, diversity in
environmental law amounts to much more than just another buzzword.
Environmental diversity does not limit itself to the tallying of plant and
animal classifications. It can be defined, codified, and measured by
248
legislators and researchers. It favors plurality, variety, multiplicity, and
divergences; it disfavors uniformity and homogeneity.

V. Justifying Diversity in Action
The preceding Parts have defended diversity as a rationale for
positive discrimination at two levels: first, as corrective and distributive
justice, the defense offered in Part III, and, second, as congruent with
well-accepted tenets, norms, policies, and political conditions as
elaborated in Part IV. We may now consider how theory reckons with
diversity reality on the ground. Toward that end, this Part discusses three
instances of diversity in action.
A. Questions of Administrability
Here we look at diversity as the last rationale standing, the only
broadscale reason for discrimination that the U.S. Supreme Court
249
As expressed in the Court’s foundational
currently condones.
jurisprudence on point, the Powell opinion in Bakke, diversity is a
uniquely nimble instrument. It sidesteps the hurt and division associated
with remembering subordination and group-based oppression.
250
Its power to evade is both a flaw and a virtue. Several progressive
writers who oppose the diversity rationale for, among other things, its
failure to grapple with historical injustice, favor it on the ground that
there is no alternative. Reminiscent of the 2004 town hall meeting where
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld infamously told U.S. soldiers
251
stationed in Kuwait that “you go to war with the Army you have,”
these supporters of affirmative action would have preferred a different
device but accept the one available. They have concluded that diversity is
easier than antisubordination to administer: less provocative, less
controversial, more optimistic. Looking forward rather than backward,
and adverting to positive rather than negative conditions, it reaches

248. See generally Nagle, supra note 244 (defining biodiversity and comparing a selection of
statutes to investigate how well they achieve this goal).
249. See supra notes 9–14.
250. Malamud, supra note 156, at 950–66 (exploring this point with reference to affirmative action
for relatively prosperous African-American recipients).
251. William Kristol, The Defense Secretary We Have, Wash. Post, Dec. 15, 2004, at A33.
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persons who would otherwise refuse to consider any rationale that makes
252
reference to distributive justice.
Papering over subordination can be an attractive practical
alternative to acknowledging it. For anti-discrimination activists, writes
Sumi Cho, diversity will have instrumental uses: It can “put a happy face
on racial oppression” and it does not “require anyone to stipulate to
white, heterosexual, or male privilege, thereby increasing chances for
253
reaching the broadest possible membership base.” Other scholars
express more frustration and dismay about papering-over as the winning
254
strategy for affirmative action.
Diversity as an anodyne rationale has the virtue of easing
255
administrability. Happy empirical claims might lack rigor, but many are
plausible enough. Even if the enhanced consequences of diversity that
researchers have celebrated might have occurred even without the
diversity initiative because open-minded people seek out varied human
environments and enjoy them, this possibility is more than a simple
misreading of correlation as causation.
For example, the premise that diversity in education or the
workforce enhances skills and performance—a virtual truism—probably
encourages some number of individuals to reach out a bit and add more
demographic variety to their lives. Other things being equal, this
outreach increases welfare. Similarly, if the diversity rationale is a
256
managerial prerogative, then managers who like prerogatives will be
drawn to diversity. Some will have good intentions and put good
consequences incidentally into effect.
Accordingly, activists who favor affirmative action out of a
commitment to principle, described in this Article as corrective and
distributive justice, may achieve some of what they want through
rhetorical deployment of diversity. Other persons, such as managers of
entities, may find anodyne diversity easier to articulate and achieve than
any other rationale for group-focused intervention. Vague criteria and
blandness become advantages in action.
At the same time, emphasizing variety rather than justice has costs
and dangers. Spokespersons who err on the side of vacuity out of caution
forgo the chance to convince receptive individuals of a justice-based
imperative. On the other end of the receptivity spectrum, even diversity

252. See generally Sullivan, supra note 16.
253. See Cho, supra note 19, at 1052. Persuaded that tactical advantage outweighed ideological
accuracy, as an activist student Cho signed on to join the Boalt Coalition for a Diversified Faculty,
even though she had preferred a more confrontational, backward-looking name for the group: “Boalt
Caucus for a Desegregated Faculty.” Id.
254. Bell, supra note 8; Lawrence, supra note 16.
255. My thanks to Nelson Tebbe for making a good case on this point.
256. See supra Part II.A.
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at its blandest might be insufficient to make a distributive scheme
acceptable to the constituencies affected, leaving diversity just as
unadministrable as affirmative action framed as antisubordination.
Different circumstances must yield divergent levels of administrability
for different characterizations of what diversity is doing.
Reformers and planners who consider diction and rhetoric for their
diversity schemes will, and in my view should, take conditions like
257
Having two categories of justification
receptivity into account.
available—the justice contention of Part III buttressed by the analogies
of Part IV—gives these implementers choices about what to emphasize
when they describe their plan to constituencies.
Administering diversity must be a work in progress—and not only
for managers. On the empirical front, for example, researchers continue
to investigate diversity. Evidence for the assertion that diversity achieves
gains is likely to mount, or at least evolve, and proponents of a scheme
258
must keep abreast of what social scientists find. As administrators, they
deal in discomfort as well as optimism: Diversity upends complacency,
broaches the occasional tough question, denies majority-group members
some of their old privilege, and pushes individuals to try something new.
B. When the Antisubordination and Variety Understandings of
Diversity Conflict
Decisional law on the diversity rationale tends to comport with the
justifications presented in both the preceding Parts: When the rationale
succeeds, courts conclude that it was right for complainants to have
suffered detriment, even though these persons were discriminated
against on the basis of an ascribed group membership that they did not
choose. The correctness of this result takes two distinct forms explored in
the two preceding Parts. First, the complainants’ group—being classed as
white is the paradigm here—has enjoyed unjustly expanded access to the
benefit in question. Second, these complainants ought to have been
turned away, other things being equal, because their group membership
leaves less room for variety in a setting where divergences are desirable.
Members of different groups would have added multiplicity and plurality
to a collective, but our complainant brings only more of the same. The
trouble with justifying diversity with reference to both distributive justice
or antisubordination, on the one hand, and variety or pluralism on the
other, is that the use of diversity as a rationale for affirmative action can
align with the first justification yet offend the second and vice versa.

257. See Krotoszynski, supra note 7, at 912–13 (adverting to the risk of backlash).
258. For a good survey of which diversity initiatives work and do not work in a particular
employment context, see Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities: Diversity and Gender
Equity in Law Firms, 24 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1041 (2011).
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Disputes from higher education admissions illustrate this
nonalignment. Contemporary admission policies manifest worry that
absent discriminatory intervention, female and Asian-American
259
applicants would enroll in excessively high numbers. Diversity as
260
261
variety supports this intervention; distributive justice opposes it. A
refusal to practice this affirmative action inverts the problem: Non-Asian
or male complainants who needed a preference to qualify and yet were
treated the same as Asian and female applicants could protest the
university’s disregard for heterogeneity in denying them admission, even
though withholding favoritism was correct as a matter of distributive
justice.
Implementers have no choice but to balance ad hoc the two
understandings of diversity as a rationale for affirmative action,
recognizing that they hold unequal weight. Justice-antisubordination will
likely be more urgent than variety because the repair of an ongoing
historical wrong outranks goals that would correct no unjust exclusion.
Variety becomes more compelling, however, whenever the magnitude of
historical injustice that oppressed a group is relatively slight. Instances of
subordination are not created equal.
C. A Case Study
In October 2011, California governor Jerry Brown announced that
he would decline to sign a new piece of legislation. He expressed
torment. The bill Brown vetoed had set out to resist a controversial antiaffirmative action initiative, Proposition 209, approved in 1996 by
California voters. As amended by Proposition 209, the California
Constitution prohibits the state from discrimination or preferential
treatment based on “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin” in
262
“public employment, public education, or public contracting.”
Proposition 209 foes had scored a victory in September 2011 when
the California legislature passed a bill authorizing the two state
university systems “to consider race, gender, ethnicity, and national
origin, along with other relevant factors, in undergraduate and graduate
admissions, to the maximum extent permitted by the 14th Amendment
259. Ilya Somin has expounded on this problem in a series of blog posts. Ilya Somin, Asian-American
Applicants and Competing Rationales for Affirmative Action in Higher Education, The Volokh
Conspiracy (Oct. 17, 2009, 1:54 AM), http://volokh.com/2009/10/17/asian-american-applicants-andcompeting-rationales-for-affirmative-action-in-higher-education; Ilya Somin, Immigrant Students and the
Tension Between Two Rationales for Affirmative Action, The Volokh Conspiracy (Feb. 5, 2007, 11:50
PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1170741033.shtml; Ilya Somin, Preferences for White Males and the Diversity
Rationale for Affirmative Action, The Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:29 AM), http://volokh.com/
2011/03/02/preferences-for-white-males-and-the-diversity-rationale-for-affirmative-action.
260. See supra Part III.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. Cal. Const. art. I, § 31(a).
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to the United States Constitution, Section 31 of Article I of the
California Constitution [the codification of Proposition 209], and
263
relevant case law.” The bill went to the governor for signature. “I
wholeheartedly agree with the goal of this legislation,” Brown
264
declared, before giving two reasons for his veto decision. First,
separation of powers doctrine means the courts, not the legislature, get
265
to “determine the limits of Proposition 209.” Second, the pro-209 side
would not sit still in response to the bill; it would “file more costly and
266
confusing lawsuits.”
Diversity as justified in this Article renders this explanation for the
veto inadequate. Perhaps the new bill did indeed clash too deeply with
Section 31, the codification of Proposition 209, to pass state
constitutional muster. Yet the bill specifically limited its reach: It insisted
that whatever it authorized had to comport with Proposition 209.
Contrary to the veto message, this bill did not decree new limits; it set
out to stay within them. Moreover, nothing in separation of powers
doctrine gives the executive more power than the legislature to draw
conclusions about what each branch may do. By voting for the bill, the
Legislature had expressed a view about its constitutional constraints. A
contrary view by the governor holds no more weight. The second reason,
a worry of stirring up “costly and confusing lawsuits,” is not only
unprincipled but unrealistic: Lawsuits over the diversity rationale for
affirmative action have been proceeding undeterred in California since
267
Bakke, and any veto message that claims “wholeheartedly [to] agree”
with what the killed bill seeks to do ought to refrain from calling
anything else confusing.
Justifying diversity would have informed the veto-or-sign dilemma.
It could have changed the outcome. The governor’s two reasons for his
veto have enough gravitas to engage with diversity only if we stay at the
268
anodyne level. If diversity amounts to nothing more than prerogatives
for managers and whitewash over a history of subordination, along with
vague tacked-on assertions about improved consequences, then the veto
message answers shallowness with shallowness. If, by contrast, diversity
honors and gives effect to principled claims for the reallocation of goods,
as I have argued in Part III, or if diversity as “a fundamental American

263. S.B. 185, 2011–12 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).
264. See Robin Wilkey, SB 185 Vetoed: Jerry Brown Vetoes Affirmative Action-Like Bill, Huffington
Post (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/09/sb-185-vetoed_n_1002099.html.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. For a sampling of the controversy as presented to California courts, see Bob Egelko, Brown
Joins Prop. 209 Challenge, S.F. Chron., Jan. 17, 2012, at C1 (reporting the progress of a federal action
against this initiative); San Jose Officials, Liberal Elite Try to Stop Prop. 209, San Jose Mercury
News, Nov. 10, 1996, at 7P (reporting lawsuit filed promptly after voter approval).
268. See supra Part II.B.
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269

principle” shares in the esteem enjoyed by fundamentals in the United
States like pluralism, decentralization, and markets, as Part IV
contended, then legislation enabling an affirmative action measure that
enhances diversity deserves a careful response.
State executives who accept the thesis of this Article should read a
diversity-enhancing affirmative-action bill with attention to distributive
justice before deciding to veto or sign it. Our hypothetical governor
knows that an affirmative-action reallocation could fail this criterion for
desert. Legislatures sometimes err: A proposed transfer might reward a
group that has no real entitlement, hurt the taken-from cohort with
unwarranted severity, or waste time and money by focusing on a trivial
characteristic. A bad diversity-promoting affirmative-action transfer—a
transfer inconsistent with distributive justice—is one that either does not
ameliorate present effects of past injustice or instills only a vacuous
heterogeneity, reminiscent of Isaiah Berlin’s “I like my coffee with milk
and you like it without; I am in favor of kindness and you prefer
270
concentration camps.”
Of course, only executive officers in government—state governors
and presidents of the United States—grapple with the veto-or-sign
dilemma. Yet justifying diversity also guides the actions of individuals
who are not state actors. In California, for instance, Jerry Brown had
faced a precursor to his veto question: As a California voter in 1996
holding no elected office he had the choice, in the seclusion of a polling
place, to oppose or support an amendment to the state constitution that
banned benign as well as invidious discrimination. Other states have also
put affirmative action to the electorate in the form of proposed
271
constitutional amendments. These initiatives gain attention when they
succeed, but others have quietly failed to engage enough voter support
272
and disappeared: Public opinion has mattered. Apart from state action,
many individuals have a voice on affirmative action proposals in their
workplaces, local schools, civic volunteering, or alumni participation in
university life.
The exercise of affirmative-action justification works similarly for
voters, nonstate decisionmakers, and public-sector executives like Jerry
Brown. Our deliberator reviews a proposed instance of affirmative action

269. Orentlicher, supra note 189.
270. See supra note 212.
271. See Barbara Hoberock, Battle Is Looming on State Question, Tulsa World, Nov. 6, 2011, at
A24 (reporting successes for affirmative-action opponents in Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and
Washington).
272. See Missouri Anti-Affirmative Action Initiative, American Civil Liberties Union (Apr. 4,
2008), http://aclu.org/racial-justice/missouri-anti-affirmative-action-initiative (reporting on an effort
that failed for lack of signatures); see also Hoberock, supra note 271 (noting that Colorado voters had
recently voted no); Amy Wood, Affirmative Action Foes: Chasing the Initiative, 21 Southern
Changes, no. 2, 1999 at 3.
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first with attention to corrective and distributive justice, and then with
273
the understanding that affirmative action typically enhances diversity —
paying heed to what diversity installs and promotes. Adding pluralism,
decentralization, and alignment with the law outside civil rights to an
assessment that starts with justice increases the chances that diversity274
promoting affirmative action will be justified. Should the proposal still
fail—not enough justice, not enough heterogeneity, not enough heft in
the heterogeneity it brings—it will have received a morally sufficient
hearing.

Conclusion
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has deemed diversity the most
acceptable rationale for actions that take civil-rights statuses into
account, and even though other decisionmakers—elected officials,
business managers, heads of colleges and universities, and military
leaders—have united to praise it, diversity still lacks justification as the
term is used in law: “The showing or maintaining in court that one had
275
sufficient reason for doing that which he is called to answer.” To date,
no such justification has emerged. Amply warned that the task will be
276
difficult, this Article has undertaken to say why imposing diversity,
even when diversity inflicts harm, can warrant approval.
When challenged in court by individuals who say that a diversity
measure hurt them, users of the rationale have responded with evasion.
For good instrumental reasons, they prefer bland affirmation to specifics.
The widely shared belief that diversity is good while quotas are bad, for
example, supports prerogatives for managers, who become free to
emphasize or retreat from diversity as they please without reckoning or
explanation. Empirical claims about the benefits of diversity might be
accurate, but they have also begged questions, confused correlation with
causation, and rested on dubious methodologies and insufficient
precision.
Implementers and the public alike find diversity more palatable
than other justice-based rationales for affirmative action—including
rectification, reparation, and desegregation—because talk of diversity
avoids the bitterness of grievances that remain, to some degree, alive and

273. See supra Part III.
274. See supra Part IV.
275. V The Oxford English Dictionary 643 (Clarendon Press 1933).
276. Writers use a variety of gerunds to describe what the diversity rationale demands. See, e.g.,
Sanford Levinson, Wrestling with Diversity (2003) (“wrestling”); Susan Schramm-Pate & Rhonda
Baynes Jeffries, Grappling with Diversity: Readings on Civil Rights Pedagogy and Critical
Multiculturalism (2008) (“grappling”); Schuck, supra note 10, at v (“managing”); Braxton, supra
note 182 (“struggling”); Ann Coulter, At the End of the Day, Diversity Has Jumped the Shark,
Horrifically, Human Events, Nov. 23, 2009, at 6 (“reckoning”).
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painful. This Article has argued that sidestepping claims of injustice is
both a strength and a weakness of the diversity rationale: strength
because palatability gives affirmative action enough political capital to be
installed, and weakness because justice dodged becomes justice at best
postponed, if not denied.
Accordingly, I have argued, the task of justifying diversity proceeds
on two levels. One level is reparative: Functioning as an element or at
least a consequence of affirmative action, diversity becomes justified as a
source of corrective and distributive justice. The other level of
justification, using analogy, works with resemblances and parallels.
Uncontroversial ideals of American law and politics—including
pluralism, separation of powers, and markets—esteem multiplicity and
variety as sources of strength.
These uncontroversial ideals give implementers guidance on how to
prepare, install, and maintain a diversity plan. “Otherwise qualified,” a
term borrowed from disability discrimination law, informs their task. For
example, the tripartite scheme of American government recognizes the
executive, legislature, and judiciary as units; a claimant that is not a unit
holds no entitlement to participate in the powers of “separation of
powers.” In a commercial market, sellers must have goods to sell and
buyers must have money to buy. Pluralism also imposes conditions for
membership. And so diversity measures, by analogy, necessarily
determine which axes of variation deserve attention and which must be
ignored.
Civil rights categories are a plausible starting point for any diversity
plan. Statutes declare that a short list of characteristics calls for attention
from positive law. By omission legislatures have also determined that
other characteristics warrant less concern. Implementers of a diversity plan
who follow this design would ignore diversity of, say, eye color or height or
hobbies on the ground that the variety in question would be trivial. At the
other end of the importance spectrum, diversity of race and sex and ability
(as an antonym of disability) warrant consideration, at least at the outset.
Implementers would cite other possible categories in the middle, eligible
for debate about whether diversity on the axis would rectify injustice, per
the antisubordination justification, or, consistent with the variety-analogy
justification, foster significant pluralism.
“Plurality, dialogue, and redundancy,” the three central virtues of
277
what Robert Schapiro calls “polyphonic federalism,” emerge from
social-setting diversity at least as well as from federalism in American
government, which can engage as few as two participants: state power
and federal power. When present in settings like schools and workplaces,

277. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental
Rights 98 (2009).
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diversity will exist on more than one axis. Polyphonic federalism
describes a national system containing several dozen states, of course,
and so what Schapiro has extolled in government will offer robust
examples of all three values. Of them, this Article has spent the most
278
As practiced by diverse participants in any
time on plurality.
ecosystem, the “dialogue” value notes mutual influence and the sharing
279
of information. Redundancy, the third virtue, offers protection should a
constituent of the mix happen to fail.
Settings where courts have condoned the diversity rationale—
sometimes as a compelling governmental interest, sometimes an option
acceptable under statutory law—illustrate plurality, dialogue, and
redundancy as policy. When the Supreme Court approved the diversity
rationale in Bakke and Grutter, it did so with reference to multiplicity
and variety rather than the rectification of injustice. The problem of
injustice persists, however, and not only because claims of historical
wrongs call for repair. Whenever scarcity exists, any policy of favoring
someone is necessarily also a policy of disfavoring someone else; though
vaunted for its optimism and good cheer, diversity can hurt.
Decisionmakers, especially when they are state actors, must apply the
rationale with care.
For these implementers of the diversity rationale, challenges will
persist. Values extolled in American law and government—including
280
“uniformity, finality, and hierarchical accountability” —stand in
contrast to diversity’s plurality, dialogue, and redundancy. As Peter
Schuck has warned, “[t]he law systematically favors homogeneity over
281
diversity.” Moreover, Schuck notes, “government and law are natural
282
enemies of diversity, especially when they are most eager to create it.”
Unfamiliarity or divergence in a human population brings discomfort to
283
individuals as well. The virtue of this dissonance as experienced by
institutions, individuals, and state actors is that it alerts participants to
gains—not only the enhancements of plurality and dialogue and
redundancy—but also the repair of wrongs.

278. See supra Part IV.A.
279. Schapiro, supra note 277, at 99–100.
280. Id. at 101–02.
281. Schuck, supra note 10, at 311.
282. Id. at 323.
283. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also David Brooks, People Like Us, Atlantic
monthly, Sept. 2003, at 32 (“Look around at your daily life. Are you really in touch with the broad
diversity of American life? Do you care?”). Summarizing his large study on civic engagement, political
scientist Robert Putnam has reported that “virtually all measures of civic health are lower in more
diverse settings.” Michael Jonas, The Downside of Diversity, Boston Globe, Aug. 5, 2007, at D1. The
more diversity is present, “the fewer people vote and the less they volunteer, the less they give to
charity and work on community projects.” Id. Moreover, “[i]n the most diverse communities,
neighbors trust one another about half as much as they do in the most homogenous settings.” Id.
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Proponents and opponents of diversity alike have been proceeding
as if the diversity rationale were thin: at best an excuse, rather than a
284
justification, for imposing detriment on human beings. Yet diversity
may be justified. Although it imposes undeniable costs and although its
application can be erroneous in particular contexts, diversity remains the
only rationale for discrimination that can work toward rectification of
historical injustice while honoring the “fundamental American
285
principle” of e pluribus unum. It posits—and has demonstrated—that
variety and difference generate strength.

284. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
285. Orentlicher, supra note 189.
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